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Preface 
 
 
This dissertation entitled “Between State and Market: The Changing Role of 
Institutions and Political Actors in East European Pension Reforms” is a publication-
based, cumulative thesis. It includes an introductory framework and four research 
papers. The framework paper seeks to summarize and complement the research 
papers that constitute the core of the dissertation. Moreover, it seeks to link the 
theoretical claims made in each of the four paper and provide an over-arching 
theoretical argument.  The four papers discussed are as follows: 
 
I. Adascalitei, Dragos and Federico Vegetti. (under review). “From 
State to Market and Back: The Politics and Economics of Pension 
Privatization in Eastern Europe.”, submitted on 18 January 2016 to 
Comparative Political Studies 
. 
II. Adascalitei Dragos and Stefan Domonkos. (2015). “Reforming Against 
all Odds: Multi-pillar Pension Systems in the Czech Republic and 
Romania.”, International Social Security Review 68(2): 85-104. 
 
III. Adascalitei Dragos. (2015) “From Austerity to Austerity: The Political 
Economy of Public Pension Reforms in Romania and Bulgaria.”, 
Social Policy & Administration Article First Published Online, (DOI: 
10.1111/spol.12173). 
 
IV. Adascalitei Dragos. (under review). “What about the non-reformers? 
The political economy of pension reforms in Belarus and Ukraine.”, 
submitted on 14 of January 2016 to Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies. 
 
 
The studies are appended to the manuscript in the aforementioned order in their most 
advanced form, as published or submitted for publication/review. Where possible, 
page numbering consistent with the page numbering of the dissertation has been 
included centered in the footer of each page. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The economic and political transition that marked the developmental paths of Central 
and Eastern European countries was accompanied by a host of institutional changes 
that completely reorganized the way in which welfare states in the region function. 
Beginning with the 1990s, the moment when most of the countries started their 
transition to a market economy, national welfare institutions underwent numerous 
changes that sought to diminish their universalist character and reorganize them 
around individualist principles. Various national and international political actors 
fought to influence this process of change, in a bid to defend their interests. As the 
literature studying the last two and a half decades of welfare state transformation in 
Central and Eastern European countries notes, the institutional outcomes of this 
process of change, bear the imprints of the diverse, and sometimes contradictory 
interests that these political actors aimed to defend (Armeanu 2010; Orenstein 2008; 
Adascalitei and Domonkos 2016). 
The literature that emphasizes the path dependence of welfare states sees the changes 
of the last decades of transformation as mostly marginal adaptations, in a process that 
added new institutional layers over a core of institutions (Inglot 2008). From this 
point of view, the new welfare state arrangements that emerged in CEECs, did not 
succeed in reaching the institutional consistency of the “welfare regimes” that 
populate advanced Western democracies, but remained caught in a stage of partial 
equilibrium punctuated by frequent attempts to renegotiate their core principles. In 
contrast, the literature that studies the political origins of the recent welfare state 
transformations, argues that the scale of changes that were passed during transition 
contributed to paradigmatic institutional shifts that re-oriented the new welfare states 
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towards particular regional models that borrow both universalist and individualist 
elements (Kuitto 2011). 
This dissertation engages with the above debates by taking the case of pension policy 
as a key example that epitomizes the most important changes which marked welfare 
state transformations in Eastern Europe. Publicly managed pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension systems are the most important welfare institutions in Eastern Europe both in 
terms of expenditure levels and coverage. In consequence, attempts to restructure the 
welfare states inherited from the state socialist period, are likely to target public 
pension systems. On the other hand, public PAYG pension systems are politically 
important, since a large number of constituents have a present or future interest in 
pension provision. In this respect, Eastern European countries are similar with their 
Western counterparts, where retrenchment attempts have been met with significant 
opposition from different societal groups and prompted governments to use a diverse 
array of obfuscation strategies (Pierson 1994). 
The purpose of the dissertation fourfold. First, it seeks to investigate the determinants 
of pension policy reforms by focusing both on explaining the outcomes of the World 
Bank (WB) campaign for the adoption of mandatory private accounts as well as of the 
parametric adjustments that were passed by governments in response to political and 
economic pressures. Second, it seeks to test whether the type of the political regime 
that emerged during transition in different countries impacted the choice of pension 
policies that have been used to adjust public pension systems. The impact of the 
regime type on pension reform outcomes remains an undertheorized field, with 
findings pointing to contradictory effects. Third, it aims to show how national elites 
have responded to international pressures to reform public pension systems and how 
they related to different alternatives of reform. While the impact of international 
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pressures on pension privatization outcomes is a relatively developed field, much less 
is known about their impact on the reforms concerning public pillars. Fourth, the 
dissertation aims to expand existing knowledge on the determinants of pension 
reforms in Eastern Europe by analyzing country cases that are less known, even in the 
regional studies literature. Therefore the case studies analyzed in each of the articles 
of the dissertation seek to bring new empirical material to explain the dynamics of 
pension reforms, in countries that do not belong to Western rim of Eastern Europe. 
The main argument of the dissertation is that the compromises forged between 
national elites and international actors around key institutional elements of pension 
systems explain the growing diversity in welfare state pathways in Eastern Europe. In 
particular, I show that whereas international actors such as the World Bank have 
prioritized parametric adjustments aimed at ensuring the long-term fiscal 
sustainability of public pension systems together with an agenda of privatization, 
national elites promoted reforms that focused predominantly on short-term goals. 
Furthermore, I argue that, an analysis of the wider group of Eastern European 
countries over a time–span that includes both the expansion and the contraction 
phases of the mandatory funded pillars in the region, shows that, on average, the more 
authoritarian countries are less likely to privatize. I show that the type of the regime 
that emerged during transition has impacted the responsiveness of national elites to 
the agenda of pension reform promoted by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
as well as the political sustainability of pension reforms. In particular, in the case of 
authoritarian countries, the choice of pension reforms was linked to the importance of 
pensioner constituencies for the survival of the regime. In contrast, in more 
democratic regimes, pension reforms were carried out by taking into account the 
interests of different societal groups, and depended on the political compromises that 
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were forged between policy makers and societal constituents. Still, a commonality 
between pension policy-making in authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes was 
that ultimately national executives could pursue an agenda of reforms that was 
disconnected from the interests of societal stakeholders. Thus oftentimes, the interests 
of trade unions or pensioner associations were sidelined when passing pension 
reforms. 
The dissertation makes use of both of a large N statistical analysis as well as of in-
depth historical comparative case study evidence based on data obtained from semi-
structured interviews. The statistical analysis is based on a database of pension 
reforms that includes both Eastern European countries that introduced mandatory 
funded pillars as well as the countries that did not opt for adopting the reform. The 
database contains information on the size of the mandatory funded pillars from 1995 
to 2014, thus covering the early stages when the reform was negotiated but none of 
the countries implemented it (1995 -1998); the decade between 1998 and 2008, when 
the policy was adopted in most of the countries and witnessed a period of expansion; 
as well as the post-crisis period, when many of the early pension privatizers have 
either partially rolled back or fully nationalized their mandatory funded pillars. Thus, 
the statistical analysis section of the dissertation seeks to provide a systematic account 
of the determinants of pension privatization in Eastern Europe by analyzing (i) why 
some countries chose to introduce mandatory funded pillars; (ii) in the countries that 
privatized, what explains the variation between the size of the mandatory funded 
pillars; and (iii) why some countries in the region chose to avoid the reform altogether 
and instead retained a public PAYG pension system. 
Furthermore, the statistical analysis is complemented by a series of in-depth case 
study analyses of pension policy making in five countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Czech 
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Republic, Belarus and Ukraine. In each of the countries, interviews with policy-
makers involved in pension reforms were conducted with the aim of gaining insights 
into the political and economic rationales that motivated particular reform episodes. 
In addition, leaders of various civil society groups involved in the reforms (trade 
unionists, members of non-governmental organizations) were also carried out, in 
order to assess how these actors were involved (if at all) in the process of pension 
reforms. Finally, employees from the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund were also interviewed in order to gain insights on how these institutions have 
sought to influence national pension reform agendas. 
The five countries epitomize the diverse political regimes and economic development 
strategies that consolidated in Eastern Europe during and after the transition from 
state socialism. While the Czech Republic and Belarus are countries that recovered 
fast from the perils of transition but built diametrically opposed political regimes, 
Ukraine is a country that still has not entirely recovered from the transition crisis and 
whose political regime alternated between phases of authoritarianism and 
democratization. In contrast, Bulgaria and Romania, are two countries that underwent 
prolonged economic transitions but where the political regimes that emerged after the 
fall of the socialist regimes have consolidated into full-fledged democracies. 
The logic of the comparative historical analysis follows Mill’s method of difference 
or the most similar cases design (Ragin 1989, Ebbinghaus 2005). The method is used 
in order to identify explanations for different outcomes of pension reforms in 
countries that display similar political and institutional features. In each of the 
chapters, the country cases are paired in order to identify the causal mechanism that 
explains the divergent reform outcomes between them. Thus, three of the papers of 
the dissertation use the most similar case design in order to investigate different 
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aspects of the determinants of pension reform in Eastern Europe. The first paper 
investigates the variation in PAYG parametric reforms and compares two structurally 
similar countries, Romania and Bulgaria, arguing that the two countries have 
increasingly diverged in terms of reform outcomes and pension system generosity. 
The second paper compares two late pension privatizers, the Czech Republic and 
Romania, showing that the two countries introduced private pillars because right-wing 
political elites preferred the policy as an alternative to parametric reforms, even a time 
when other countries in the region were scaling back their mandatory funded pillars. 
The third case oriented paper, compares Belarus and Ukraine, two non-privatizers and 
shows that the political regime type mattered both for the rejection of the WB 
privatization agenda, as well as for the particular parametric pension system 
adjustments that each of the two comparators opted for. 
In the following section I critically discuss the literature on the determinants of 
pension policy reforms in Eastern Europe. Since most of the current debates have 
focused on the determinants of reforms that have changed the institutional structure of 
publicly managed PAYG pension systems through the introduction of mandatory 
private accounts, I begin by outlining the main claims stemming from this literature. I 
show that the main variables used in the literature for explaining pension privatization 
reform outcomes have been: the presence of economic constraints, veto points, the 
political regime types, the ideological preferences of national political elites, and the 
influence exercised by various international actors. I show that these factors have also 
influenced the type of parametric pension adjustments that each country chose to 
undertake. However, in spite of being equally important to pension privatization 
measures, I argue that parametric adjustments have received much less attention in the 
literature. 
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Building on the literature review, I then outline the elements of my theory that 
describes the political and economic determinants of pension reforms in Eastern 
Europe. I separate between reforms that seek to shift part of the social security 
contributions to mandatory private accounts and reforms that preserve the institutional 
structure of the pension system but, nonetheless, adjust the present or future size of 
the pension benefits. I then contextualize the theoretical claims by using the empirical 
findings of each of the papers included in the dissertation. 
 
2. Conceptual Debates on the Determinants of Pension Reforms 
 
2.1. Economic Constraints 
 
The fiscal crisis of public PAYG pension systems has been amongst the most 
important factors associated in the literature with increased reform activity. Ever since 
the influential report published by the World Bank (1994), Averting the World Age 
Crisis, the need to limit the growing expenditures of public PAYG pension systems 
has been cited as a reason for retrenchment. As the report notes, there are several 
sources of growing expenditures that contribute to the emergence of fiscal crises in 
public pension systems: demographic factors, economic crises, and labor market 
imbalances. 
The existence of adverse demographics has been pointed out as one of the main 
variables explaining the fiscal crisis of public pension systems in both Western and 
Eastern Europe (Pierson 1996; Cerami and Vanhuysse 2009; European Commission 
2012, Adascalitei 2012). Low birth rates combined with increased life expectancy 
amongst the elderly impacted the fiscal sustainability of public PAYG pension 
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systems through increased elderly dependency ratios. In addition, in Eastern Europe, 
the impact of the demographic challenge on public pensions was enhanced by two 
regional peculiarities. First, the pro-natalist policies promoted by many governments 
during socialism have created disproportionately large cohorts that began to retire 
around 2000s, at a time when the public PAYG pension systems began to mature. 
This added a large fiscal burden to public pension systems, requiring governments to 
increasingly rely on additional income from general taxes in order to cover social 
security deficits. Second, the free movement of labor within the European Union (EU) 
has led to massive waves of migration amongst the working age population from the 
New Member States (NMS) towards Western Europe – thus decreasing the number of 
potential contributors to social security budgets. 
The region has been also impacted by numerous economic crises that have put public 
finances under strain. The link between the presence of economic crises and pension 
reforms has been tested numerous times, although with mixed results. Müller (1999) 
argues that economic crises increase the likelihood of radical pension reforms since, 
during crisis moments, reform minded ministries gain more power. In this sense, 
Ministries of Finance, the traditional supporters of pension privatization can push for 
their agenda, while bypassing the more social oriented ministries, such as the Ministry 
of Labor.  
Economic crises also impact the likelihood of pension reforms through their direct 
effect on benefit levels. Brooks (2006) argues that economic crises signal the 
problems that public PAYG pension systems face, and create a “negative consensus” 
amongst present or future pensioners who begin to demand systemic reforms of the 
present pension system. Thus the demand for pension reforms that introduce new 
institutional designs, such as mandatory private accounts, increases because both 
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retires and those about to retire perceive the existent system as unfair. Furthermore, 
economic crises increase the likelihood of pension reforms by enhancing the influence 
exercised by international actors and by reducing the power of the actors that 
traditionally oppose pension reforms, such as trade unions, left wing parties or 
pensioner associations (Müller 2003; Orenstein 2008). Since governments in the 
region have usually sought external financial help when faced with fiscal crises, 
external actors, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank 
(WB), advanced their agenda either directly, through conditionalities attached to loan 
agreements, or indirectly by providing technical and financial support to elites who 
supported privatization and retrenchment reforms. 
Still, the impact of crisis on pension privatization remains controversial as countries 
that underwent significant crisis episodes have not necessarily introduced private 
pensions and vice-versa (Armeanu 2010). Rather, crisis episodes seem to act as an 
intervening variable that create the need to reform. More so, economic crises alone 
cannot explain whether pension reforms will go in a liberalizing or nationalizing 
direction. Indeed, comparing the impact of different crisis episodes on mandatory 
second pillar reforms shows a changing relationship: whereas during the early and 
late 1990s economic crises have been accompanied by episodes of privatization, 
during the recent economic crisis, cash stripped governments have rolled back some 
of the reforms adopted earlier (Drahokoupil and Domonkos 2012). 
Still, in the very least, crisis episodes triggered the need of adjusting pensions in the 
short term through changes in the benefit generosity. Indeed, the crises that marked 
the transitions from state socialism have been associated with episodes of “hidden 
retrenchment” (Hacker 2004, Pierson 1996) in which governments sought ease the 
fiscal pressure on social security budgets by not applying indexation rules, and thus 
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leaving the real value of pension benefits to fall against inflation. Hidden 
retrenchment was one of the most widespread measures used by cash-stripped 
governments since its impact on budgets was immediate and its visibility amongst 
constituents was low. 
Besides, economic crises generated labor market imbalances which impacted the 
revenue side of social security budgets. High levels of informality and widespread tax 
evasion decreased significantly revenues gathered from contribution rates. State 
owned enterprises typically defaulted on their social security contributions while 
small and medium enterprises usually opted for using illegal employment contracts in 
order to avoid paying social security taxes. In addition, public pension systems have 
been used as alternatives to taking up unemployment. Since unemployment systems 
were initially underdeveloped and payed extremely low benefits, redundant workers 
were allowed to take early retirement in order to avoid entering extreme poverty. The 
liberalization of retirement rules led to rapidly growing numbers of early retirees that 
amounted to “pensioner booms” during the first decade of transition (Vanhuysse 
2006). Subsequently, the intake of new pensioners required governments to increase 
contribution levels in a bid to keep social security deficits under control.  
 
2.2. Veto Points and Interest Groups 
 
A broad literature has focused on the impact of domestic actors on the outcomes of 
pension reforms around the world. Given that pension reforms are generally highly 
visible measures that are likely to affect the interests of different societal groups 
involved in the political process, their adoption might be met with opposition. In this 
respect, depending on the political resources that each of the actors with a stake in 
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pension policy is endowed with, their “veto” on particular policies can derail 
substantially the reform path. Veto players can be represented by different political 
entities such as parts of the bureaucratic apparatus, political parties or trade unions. 
The influence of bureaucracies over the pension reforms has been long established. 
Orenstein (2000) finds that government agencies influenced the design and 
implementation of privatizing reforms in three East European cases. Notably he 
shows that in countries where the number of bureaucratic veto players was lower the 
reform was more radical and was implemented faster. Furthermore, Cook (2007) 
argues that pension reforms have been above all shaped by different statist elites that 
had not been in any way accountable to societal constituencies prior to the collapse of 
the socialist regimes. These elites included trade union leaderships, welfare sector 
administrators or welfare ministries. Since these elites had privileged access to 
welfare state resources, they had the capacity to influence the scope of pension 
reforms. Thus, pension reform outcomes ultimately depended on how these actors 
split themselves during transition between reformist and statist oriented groups. In 
countries where reformist groups embodied by liberalizing technocrats prevailed, 
pension systems were privatized and retrenched. By comparison, in countries where 
bureaucratic elites favored the status-quo and aligned themselves with organizations 
that began to represent societal interests such as old trade unions, pension 
privatization reforms did not take place. At the same time, the retrenchment of public 
PAYG pension systems has been much less radical, with pensioners being better 
protected against poverty in comparison with other societal groups (young workers, 
the unemployed). 
Furthermore, party competition influences pension policy reform outcomes by 
making political agreements over reforms more or less likely. Both qualitative and 
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quantitative analyses underline the importance of legislative decision-making when it 
comes to pension policies. Cashu (2002) finds that the high fractionalization of the 
party system impacts negatively the likelihood of introducing mandatory private 
accounts. As privatization is a policy that impacts the interests of a wide range of 
actors who have a stake in pension policy, its adoption requires policy-makers to 
generate inclusive pro-reform coalitions. Besides, policy makers aim to include a 
broader array of interests, because this can ensure that in the post adoption phase, 
reforms are less likely to be reversed (Guardiancich 2013). However, when political 
fractionalization is high, reaching agreements on pension reforms that have long 
lasting distributive implications for present and future pensioners is politically 
unattainable as the presence of a high number of parties increases the political costs of 
creating a compromise. On a similar note, Brooks (2002; 2005) argues that the higher 
the number of political parties inside legislatures, the lower the chances of introducing 
mandatory private accounts. The finding holds across a sample of both Eastern 
European and Latin American countries and confirms insights from the political 
economy literature suggesting that, in general, in fractionalized systems, welfare 
reforms are less likely to occur because governments will be reluctant to search for 
support in contentious policy areas.  
In contrast, Armeanu (2010) is more cautions in linking the number of veto points 
with welfare reform outcomes. While acknowledging the empirical evidence that 
assigns explanatory power to the veto-points theory, she contends that the sheer 
number of veto-points existent in a system does not tell much about pension reform 
outcomes. However, her approach consists of analyzing the impact of veto points that 
stem from the institutional organization of the political power which distinguishes 
between presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems. From this point of 
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view, she finds no relationship between the type of political organization and reform 
activity, showing that, despite the fact that on average presidential systems have been 
more successful in passing radical pension reforms than parliamentary systems, 
variation amongst countries with presidential systems remains wide, which lends little 
explanatory power to the above distinction. 
Finally, the influence of trade unions in pension and welfare state reforms has been 
much more limited in comparison with that of bureaucratic and partisan interests. As 
much of the literature on trade union survival in Eastern Europe shows, unions 
became marginalized ever since the beginning of  the transition period and suffered a 
process of organizational and institutional decline that reduced their influence on 
national level policy making (Crowley and Ost 2001; Crowley 2004). Despite the fact 
that pension reforms have been oftentimes negotiated within national tripartite 
institutions, agreements reached within these institutions never had a binding 
character for governments. With few exceptions (Bernaciak, Duman, and Šćepanović 
2011, Adascalitei and Muntean 2014, Adascalitei and Guga 2015), trade unions could 
not constitute a serious threat for welfare reforms. Instead, governments in search for 
political support for pension reforms sought to subordinate trade unions to their 
agenda of reform, in a bid to make unions accept reforms that oftentimes went against 
trade union interests. 
At the same time, unions themselves had a mixed agenda towards pension reforms. 
While openly opposing retrenchment of public PAYG pension systems and especially 
the increase in retirement ages and the elimination of special retirement regimes, their 
relationship with reforms that introduced mandatory private accounts has been mixed. 
While sometimes unions have openly supported privatization, out of concerns that 
public pension systems could not cater to future pensioners due to their growing fiscal 
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problems (Müller 1999), in other cases they opposed the policy because privatization 
envisioned no place for unions in the management of the future pension funds (Cashu 
2002).  Therefore, in the absence of a well-defined position on pension reforms and 
facing a decline in their institutional and political power, trade unions could only 
rarely constitute a serious threat for pension privatization.   
 
2.3. Political Regime Types   
 
The impact of political regime types on pension and welfare state outcomes has been 
usually subsumed to the question of how capable are various regime types to pass 
particular reforms. Beginning with the Chilean experience, where an authoritarian 
political regime has succeeded in fully privatizing its pension system, the scholarship 
studying the impact of regime types on pension reform outcomes has tended to 
associate the presence of authoritarianism with the introduction of mandatory private 
accounts and the retrenchment of the public PAYG pension systems. In a study of 
nine Latin American countries over a period of twenty years, Mesa-Lago and Müller 
(2002) find that the degree of pension privatization is negatively correlated with the 
presence of democratic institutions: the more authoritarian the regime is at the time of 
the reform, the more it will downsize the public pension system. In comparison, 
democratic regimes are found to be more likely to strengthen the public pension 
system at the expense of opting for complete or partial privatization (Mesa-Lago and 
Müller 2002, 704–706). In more authoritarian regimes, right wing economists, IFIs, as 
well as business and financial sector interests could exercise their influence outside 
the control of democratic political decision making. Thus, the institutional 
arrangements in authoritarian regimes, which allowed these interests to exercise 
influence over unconstrained executives, paved the way for pension privatization in 
 16 
 
several Latin American countries. In comparison, in democratic regimes, competing 
interests, represented by left-wing political parties, state sector bureaucracies, trade 
unions or pensioners’ associations could exercise their voice and stop or reverse 
attempts to privatize public pension systems. 
Similarly, in an analysis of a wider sample of countries, including both Latin 
American and Eastern European states, Brooks (2002) finds that less democratic 
countries are more likely to pass more radical pension privatizations. Therefore, the 
more open the political process is, the more accountable the political elites to 
competing demands for redistribution.  
The relationship between regime types and pension reform outcomes has also been 
theorized in the context on Eastern European countries. In a comparison of three East 
European cases, Poland, Hungary and Kazakhstan, Orenstein (2000) finds that the 
more authoritarian regime present in Kazakhstan has implemented a much more 
radical pension reform in comparison with its democratic counterparts. Following the 
Chilean model of pension reform, the Kazakhstani reform proceeded in a quick 
manner since it met no opposition from internal political actors. As Cook (2007) 
notes, the presence of a strong, liberalizing executive in a context of powerless statist 
elites allowed a full replacement of the public pension system with a private 
alternative. 
Still, the impact of regime types on pension reforms in Eastern Europe is not as 
straightforward. Looking at the entire sample of countries, reveals mixed results. 
While none of the democratic regimes in the region have fully privatized their pension 
systems, in a majority of countries partial privatization has taken place. At the same 
time, democratic regimes have pursued much more reforms that retrenched their 
public pension systems including increasing retirement ages, shifting social security 
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contributions to workers, tightening eligibility criteria, and eliminating special 
retirement regimes. 
Moreover, the relationship between regime types and pension reforms is complicated 
by the wave of pension reform reversals triggered by the recent economic crisis. The 
fiscal problems created by the crisis together with the declining performance of 
pension funds, has prompted a wave of fund nationalizations and partial reversals in 
both authoritarian and democratic regimes (Drahokoupil and Domonkos 2012; 
Zhandildin 2015). The crisis has called into question theories of pension reform that 
claimed that the sustainability of private pillars depends on how inclusive was the 
political bargaining process during their adoption phase (Guardiancich 2013). Rather, 
the crisis has revealed that reversals took place both in cases in which private pillars 
were introduced with a wide support from various actors as well as in cases where 
they were adopted without reaching consensus. 
As Forrat (2012) notes, authoritarian regimes are as diverse as democracies it comes 
to the choice of welfare policies that they employ. Variation stems from the different 
logics that underpin the functioning of welfare policies in authoritarian regimes, 
which can, for example, seek to create loyalty or control different groups, serve 
clientelistic relationships, or represent elite efforts to respond to social needs. Still, 
one common factor that unites the manner in which welfare policy-making is carried 
out in authoritarian cases is that elites are the main actors responsible for maintaining 
welfare provisions. In the absence of serious opposition coming either form the civil 
society or political parties, welfare policies respond to ruling elite ideas about 
developmental trajectories of their respective countries. 
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2.4. Party Ideologies 
 
The analysis of the impact of political ideologies on welfare reforms has a long 
tradition in the “power resources theory” that sought to explain parties’ political 
influence on welfare state expenditures in Western democracies (Huber and Stephens 
2001; Bonoli and Natali 2012). In the case of Western European welfare states, the 
power resources theory held that distributive conflicts organized along class lines that 
take place between different interest groups shape the amount of resources that each 
country allocated for their welfare state expenditures (Korpi 2006). Thus the impact 
of governing parties on welfare state polices is significant: when in power, strong left-
wing parties whose main constituents are working-class groups support generous 
welfare state states. In comparison, governments dominated by right-wing parties 
seek to cut back welfare state spending. While the theory remained an important 
analytical tool for understanding welfare state change, its explanatory power was 
questioned by those who observed that in an era of permanent austerity, parties lacked 
the capacity to cut back popular welfare state programs (Pierson 1994). 
In Eastern Europe, the traditional left-right divide between parties was also found to 
matter for how parties chose to manage welfare state expenditures. In an early study 
on how party competition influences welfare state policies Lipsmeyer (2000) shows 
that legislatures dominated by right–wing parties are more likely to pass policies that 
restrict welfare expenditures through the introduction of means-testing of benefits, 
alterations of benefit duration, and the individualization of welfare services. Pension 
spending was particularly affected by right-wing legislatures which decreased 
spending through lowering benefit replacement rates, switching to flat rate pension 
schemes, and shifting social security contributions from employers to employees.  
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In contrast, the role that left-wing party ideologies play in welfare reform is not as 
clear-cut. Although some authors find that the effect of the left-wing parties on 
welfare expenditures goes in the expected direction, with left-wing parties being more 
likely to increase welfare expenditures (Careja and Emmenegger 2012), the issue 
remains contested. Cook et al. (1999) show that left-wing parties can be divided into 
three main groups, with different preferences for welfare reforms and different 
genealogical roots: the unreformed left, which are the direct successors of the 
communist parties and who seek to preserve the socialist values or to fully reinstate 
the socialist system and to preserve the inherited welfare institutions, the reformed 
social democrats who advocate for a slow transition to market with the state assuming 
a central role in the provision of social benefits, and the historically-based social 
democrats who also advocate a social market approach. As a result, generally when in 
power, left parties assume a pro-welfare discourse “seeking to defend or re-establish 
the welfare state values in the new political context” but without pursuing broadly 
social democratic welfare state policies (Cook et al. 1999: 241). Instead they either 
defended the welfare state against neo-liberal or ad-hoc full dismantling, or adopted a 
centrist position, speaking more to the median voter rather than to a purely left 
constituency. The ambivalent position of left-wing parties towards welfare policies 
was generated by the conflicting pressures they faced: while having to remain 
consistent with their left-wing ideology, they needed to prove their commitment to the 
democratic capitalist system. And, since left-wing parties need to prove themselves as 
credible political competitors, they pursued policies that endorsed fiscal responsibility 
and not redistributive or protectionist policies (Tavits and Letki 2009). 
Furthermore, the effect of ideology on preferences for pension privatization also 
remains unclear. Since pension privatization became a highly politicized issue and 
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parties both on the left and right lacked coherent programs, the policy found 
supporters in both camps (Orenstein 2000; Appel and Orenstein 2013). Armeanu 
(2010) confirms this view and claims that the traditional division between left-wing 
and right-wing parties needs reassessment if it is to help in explaining why some 
countries privatized while others chose not to do so. With the exception of small 
right-wing parties, which consistently supported the reform, political parties in the 
region did not have a consistent stance towards the policy. Left-wing parties did not 
necessarily oppose privatization, nor did they automatically support the policy. 
Instead, their position depended on whether they underwent a process of 
modernization that moved them towards embracing social democratic values.  
While ideology effects are not straightforward, one can understand support for 
privatization in terms of diffuse and concentrated costs and benefits. The policy does 
have diffuse costs which are spread across different groups in the population (Pierson 
2000). Despite the fact that private pension funds favor high income workers at the 
expense of low income workers, its benefits cut across different organizational 
groups. At the same time, although privatization favors younger workers, its 
distributional impact is not immediate and does not affect current pensioners, making 
the policy easy to defend both from a right-wing as well as from a left-wing position. 
The only parties that openly opposed privatization were nationalist parties. They did 
so because of their anti-capitalist discourse that framed the policy along national 
interest lines as well as because of their connections with special interest groups that 
held pension privileges under the state managed system (Armeanu 2010, 32–34). 
Within the context of the recent wave of reversals of privatizing reforms that took 
place in Eastern Europe, ideological stances also played a diminished role. As the 
literature shows, pension privatization reversals took place in response to short term 
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financing needs triggered by the economic crisis of the late 2000s rather than because 
of ideological reasons (Datz and Dancsi 2013). In fact, the volatility of East European 
private pension arrangements during the recent crisis, shows that during the short 
period since their adoption, private pillars did not succeed in creating a coherent 
constituency in their favor nor amongst political parties neither amongst pension 
system contributors. 
 
2.5. International Actors  
 
International actors have been directly involved in the reform of East European public 
pension systems. Ever since the publication of the World Bank’s programmatic 
report, Averting the Old Age Crisis (World Bank 1994), international actors have 
sought to influence the way in which public pension systems were changed. The 
report contained the main ideas that international actors endorsed in the domain of 
pension reforms. The World Bank (WB) argued that, especially in developing 
countries, public pay-as-you-go pension systems faced an impending fiscal crisis due 
to pressures stemming from population ageing, the maturation of public PAYG 
pension systems, high levels of social security coverage, easy access to early 
retirement benefits, already high contribution rates, and insufficient increases in 
national productivity levels (World Bank 1994, 140). The antidote, as the WB 
famously claimed, is the retrenchment of the public PAYG pension systems to paying 
minimum flat-rate pensions and the introduction of earnings related benefits to be 
provided through mandatory savings accounts (Adascalitei and Domonkos 2015). 
The above recipe for reforms has been promoted through the region with different 
degrees of success. Orenstein (2000; 2008) finds that pressure exercised by 
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International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and especially by the WB, has been vital for 
the introduction of mandatory private accounts in the region. The WB has endorsed 
the adoption of private pillars with the help of “campaign coalitions” that employed 
both international and domestic resources. At the international level, the WB made 
use of its influence in order to spread ideas about privatization thorough publications, 
working groups, and conferences. At the national level, the institution sought to push 
the reform by providing technical assistance, seminars, and loans while seeking to 
identify national policy entrepreneurs that were receptive to the idea of privatization. 
Support from national actors was sought at different stages of the policy process: 
commitment building, coalition building, and implementation (Orenstein 2008, 59). 
The influence that IFIs exerted on national policies varied widely within the region. 
The literature that focuses on countries belonging to the Community for Independent 
States (CIS) argues that while international pressure for welfare reforms existed, this 
pressure has been strongly filtered by the preferences of domestic actors (Cook 2007). 
Thus, the international efforts towards pension privatisation have been conditioned by 
the outcomes of national political conflicts. The weaker role played by IFIs in the CIS 
region led to fewer cases of privatization and subsequently to less retrenchment in 
public pension systems.  
Additionally, as the literature on the diffusion of pension privatization notes, an intra-
regional peer effect is noticeable in the case of Eastern European countries. Brooks 
(2005) finds that in Eastern Europe countries are more likely to privatize if their 
neighbours have done so. At the same time, she finds no support for the influence of 
IFIs through constraints associated with loan agreements. In this respect she lends 
credibility to the hypothesis that the more effective means of promoting pension 
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privatization made use of “soft power” resources such as the dissemination of ideas 
about welfare reforms (Weyland 2005). 
Furthermore, while IFIs have indeed actively promoted the spread of pension 
privatization and retrenchment during the 1990s and early 2000s, their preferences 
regarding the policy have gradually shifted, resulting in a decline in the number of 
countries that opted for privatization. The turn in preferences towards the advice 
given to countries regarding pension reforms took place because of two reasons. First, 
the large costs associated with the adoption of pension privatization became evident, 
making policy makers question the effectiveness of the policy in addressing the 
demographic ageing problem (Drahokoupil and Domonkos 2012). Second, the crisis 
has exposed the volatility of private funds in the context of financial downturns and 
gave credibility to critics of privatization (Orenstein 2011). In this context, IFIs 
seemed to have recently retreated from actively promoting privatization.  
 
3. Changing the East European Pension Systems 
 
In light of the literature discussed above, this dissertation seeks to explain the 
determinants of both parametric and structural pension reforms. Thus, its main 
contribution lies in providing a more systematic and accurate account of the numerous 
ways in which East European pension systems have been transformed during the past 
two and a half decades. Taken together, the four papers of the dissertation emphasize 
the interplay between domestic and international actors in determining the pension 
reform pathway that each of the five countries undertook. 
In the case of the structural pension reforms, the dissertation finds evidence for 
partisan effects in the adoption of private pillars. In particular, it shows that right-
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wing governments were more likely to defend second pillars once these were in place. 
Furthermore, in the case of late privatisers, the dissertation shows that right-wing 
parties have been strongly in favour of mandatory funded pillar reforms, even if, at 
the time, other countries in the region were turning against the policy. However, even 
though right-wing parties strongly supported pension privatization out of ideological 
concerns, they had to take into account the experience of countries that privatized 
earlier. In this sense, the dissertation shows that the ideological preference for the 
pension privatization is moderated by the experience of problems faced by early 
privatizers, resulting in smaller and more regulated mandatory funded pillars. 
The dissertation also brings evidence that public pension system adjustments have 
been passed in response to a variety of domestic and international pressures. 
Importantly, it finds that public pensions have been reformed primarily in response to 
short-term fiscal and political concerns. However, public pension reforms passed in 
response to short-term pressures have had a significant fiscal impact on public PAYG 
pension systems, which ultimately led to an increased cross-national divergence in 
pension system characteristics. Furthermore, the divergence between countries also 
stemmed from the unintended consequences of pension reforms: in contexts of weak 
enforcement capacity by state institutions, retrenchment reforms led workers to 
massively take up early retirement benefits, out of fears that, in the future, it would 
take too long to reach the retirement age.  
Furthermore, the dissertation finds evidence that political fractionalization of the 
legislative impacted the choice of pension reforms. In particular it finds that extreme 
fractionalization levels, resulted in competition through generosity increases that went 
beyond sustainable levels of expenditure. At the same time party fractionalization 
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ultimately impacted the success of reforms that sought to introduce mandatory funded 
pillars.   
Moreover, the political regime type did matter for whether a country opted for 
introducing mandatory private accounts or not. In particular, more democratic Eastern 
European countries have been more likely to introduce private pillars. The finding 
goes against the veto player literature which suggests that, since more authoritarian 
regimes can bypass societal interests, they will be more likely to introduce private 
pillars. In the context of Eastern European cases, this does not necessarily hold for 
several reasons. First, while more democratic regimes have been indeed more 
accountable to their constituents, this did not preclude them from reforming public 
pensions without including the interests of the opponents of the reform. In fact, in 
many democratic regimes, pension and other welfare policies have been changed 
without the consultation of the interest groups that could oppose reforms (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008). Second, in democratic regimes, traditional veto players have 
been either too weak to oppose pension reforms that went against their interests or 
have openly supported the reforms. Therefore, in many Eastern European countries 
pension privatization has been actively supported by left-wing parties and trade 
unions alike. Third, in the case of Eastern Europe, more democratic regimes have 
been more open to international advice regarding pension reforms. This is a 
peculiarity of the region that sets it apart from Latin America – where authoritarian 
regimes have been heavily involved in promoting privatization measures with the 
support of IFIs.  
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3.1. A model of Pension Reforms 
 
As the literature review has shown, there is a variety of domestic and international 
actors and institutions that can impact pension reform outcomes. What is evident, is 
that no single variable can account for the diversity of outcomes that marked pension 
policy making in Eastern Europe. Pension systems went through different phases of 
expansion and austerity over the last two and a half decades that responded to 
different pressures to reform coming from both national and international levels. 
While paying attention to the findings outlined in the literature review, the theoretical 
model presented in Figure 1 below illustrates the determinants of pension reform 
outcomes. 
Figure 1. A model of Pension Reforms in Eastern Europe 
 
 
The model assigns an important role to the economic constraints created by economic 
changes at the national and international levels. While, economic constraints alone do 
not determine reform outcomes, they contribute nonetheless to creating pressures to 
reform. Since East European economies are heavily integrated in world markets, 
changes in the international economic environment are especially important for 
 27 
 
domestic policies (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). At the same time, the domestic 
economic environment matters equally for what policies governments chose to 
pursue. As much of the literature focused on the economic transition has argued, 
given the deep economic domestic crises that many of the countries in the region have 
underwent, governments had to resort to a host of emergency welfare policies in order 
to adapt pension systems to the new economic environment, but also to ensure a 
minimum of benefit generosity for pensioners (Inglot 2008; Makszin 2013). 
Furthermore, the model distinguishes between long-term and short-term pressures. 
Ageing is the most important long-term pressure that pension systems face. The 
model theorises that ageing influences in particular the position that international 
actors have on pension reforms and the advice that they pass to governments. In this 
respect, the model suggests that while international actors have changed their position 
vis a vis pension privatization since the advent of the economic crisis, their policy 
stance towards public pension reform has remained unchanged during the past two 
decades. As a result, their policy advice on reforming public PAYG pension systems, 
emphasizes the long-term fiscal pressures created by ageing and advocates for 
policies that are consequential for future generations of pensioners. They include: 
increasing and equalizing retirement ages for men and women, increasing the 
minimum contributory ages for obtaining full pension benefits, elimination of special 
retirement regimes, and suppressing early retirement policies.  
In comparison, domestic actors pay attention predominantly to short-term pressures, 
and react with policies that seek to address them. Thus, the model predicts that short-
term pressures stemming from changes in the domestic or international environments 
will have a comparatively larger impact on policy preferences of domestic actors than 
long-term pressures. Thus, during periods of economic decline, pension systems will 
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be retrenched through policies such as changes in the indexation procedures or 
increases in the contribution rates. In contrast, during periods of growth, pension 
benefits will be indexed generously, since the domestic actors will have inflated 
expectations about the state of the economy. At the same time, national political 
actors react to short-term pressures generated by the electoral competition and will 
seek to gain votes through increasing the generosity of pension benefits especially 
during times of economic growth. The model thus suggests that, short-term 
adjustments in pension benefit levels will be tied to the electoral cycle.  
Since long-term retrenchment policies are politically costly and require substantial 
political resources, domestic actors will pursue such reforms mainly when 
international actors will be involved in the policy-arena. The model thus expects that 
retrenchment through increases in retirement ages for example, is more likely to take 
place when domestic actors cooperate with international actors. Furthermore, the 
involvement of international actors in pension policy making will provide a political 
resource for domestic actors. Thus, retrenchment reforms are likely to be blamed on 
international actors, since domestic actors will employ “blame avoidance” strategies 
(Pierson 1994) in order to avoid electoral punishment. 
The model also suggests that because public pension policies react primarily to short-
term pressures generated by economic shifts or the electoral arena, they can become 
fiscally unsustainable and therefore add to the long-term fiscal problems that pension 
systems already face. Thus, reforms that respond to short-term pressures can generate 
even more pressures to reform since they do not have a base in the real economy. This 
was the case of most of the parametric pension system adjustments passed during 
periods of economic growth in Eastern Europe. Adjustments in benefit generosity of 
public pensions usually bypassed automatic indexation rules and mandated numerous 
 29 
 
increases ahead of electoral moments. This practice led to peculiar developments in 
some countries in the region in which average public pensions grew faster than 
average wages. 
 
3.2. An Overview of the Contributions 
 
The first paper of the dissertation analyses the determinants of pension privatization 
in Eastern Europe (see Table 1). Using a novel dataset of data on pension 
privatization, that includes a continuous measure of the size of the mandatory funded 
pillar, the paper argues that non-democratic regimes are less likely to privatize 
pensions. Furthermore, the paper uses a novel statistical technique, a zero one inflated 
beta regression (ZOIB), to distinguish between three qualitatively different events: the 
option to introduce mandatory private accounts (privatize), the option to avoid 
privatization altogether (reject privatization), and once the decision to privatize has 
been made, the option to decide about the size of the mandatory funded pillar. The 
paper also shows that the political ideologies impact differently the decision to 
privatize versus the option to adjust the size of mandatory funded pillars. It finds that, 
on average, right-wing governments do not support the introduction of the mandatory 
funded pillars in Eastern Europe, but once these welfare institutions are in place, 
governments are likely to defend privatization and support larger funded pillars.  
At the same time, the paper finds no effect of left-wing governments neither on the 
decision to introduce mandatory funded pillars nor on their size. This finding is 
echoed in the literature by much case study evidence which shows that left-wing 
parties have had an ambivalent position towards pension privatization. Whereas in 
some countries they have openly promoted the reform, in others they have either 
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openly opposed it or have been indifferent to it. As Armeanu (2010) notes, except for 
the unreformed communist left parties, which strongly opposed the reform as part of 
their anti-market discourse, social-democratic and leftist parties have indeed varied in 
their stances towards the reform. 
Furthermore, the paper finds evidence for the impact of economic conditions on the 
decisions to introduce private pillars. In particular, it shows that domestic external 
debt crises as well as economic crises reflected by drops in GDP levels have had a 
negative impact on the countries’ decisions to privatize. The findings go against 
arguments that emphasize the benefits of the economic crises for welfare reforms and 
suggest that when including both the transitional and the recent economic crises in the 
analysis, the likelihood of adopting mandatory funded pillars decreases. The finding 
suggests that the transitional crises that have marked the transition from socialist 
regimes in Eastern Europe have been in many aspects unique. They have been 
accompanied by a tendency of governments to reduce the state involvement in 
welfare provision that was not present during the recent economic crisis.  
If something, the recent crisis has showed the limits of pension privatization, and in 
most of the countries in the region, has led to a reversal of early reforms. In this 
respect, even countries that privatised late, such as Romania, have attempted to 
reverse their reforms, whereas even later privatizers, such as the Czech Republic are 
already entirely reversing the reform. Furthermore, the transitional crises and the 
recent economic crises differ in the type of advice that IFIs have given to 
governments with respect to pension reforms. Whereas during the crises of the late 
1990s IFIs have unequivocally advocated for the privatisation of public pension 
systems, and sought to hide the long-term fiscal impact of the reform (the double 
payment problem), by the time the recent economic crisis has hit the region, they have 
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moderated their position regarding pension privatization and focused more on 
promoting the retrenchment of public pension systems.  
Building on these findings, the second paper of the dissertation analyses the passing 
of reforms that introduced mandatory private accounts in two countries, Romania and 
the Czech Republic. It explains why, in a context of a turn against the pension 
privatization in both national and international circles, some countries still opted to 
adopt the reform.  
The paper shows that, the two cases of late privatization are explained by the 
ideological preferences of the domestic elites, who strongly supported the reforms. In 
both countries, the advocates of the private pillars were political elites (political 
parties, non-governmental institutions) who supported the privatization agenda a 
decade earlier but failed to push for the reform in the past. In this respect, the paper 
finds evidence for traditional party politics theories of welfare reforms that posit that 
right-wing ideology is associated with support for the individualization and 
marketization of welfare services.  
Furthermore, the paper finds that the two cases of late-privatization differed in 
important aspects from what early privatizers have done. It shows that the policy 
debate in the case of these two late reformers was informed by the discussions that 
motivated the adoption of mandatory private accounts a decade earlier but that a 
limited amount of learning has also taken place. In particular, late-privateers have 
paid more attention to issues concerning the fiscal impact of the mandatory funded 
pillar adoption and to the regulatory problems that early adopters faced. Therefore the 
paper finds that domestic right-wing elites have also learned from earlier reformers 
and as a result have followed a more conservative path to mandatory funded pillar 
reforms. Therefore, in the case of the two late-privatizers policy learning resulted in 
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much smaller and more regulated private pillars in comparison with the countries that 
privatized earlier. Still, policy learning was uneven and was limited to the above 
aspects of the reform. Many of the policy mistakes done by early-privatizers, 
including the poor regulation of the pay-out phase were replicated by late reformers as 
well. 
The third paper investigates the link between the domestic retirement policies and 
short-term pressures to adjust public pension systems. Unlike the first two papers, it 
aims to explain how public pension systems in two Eastern European countries, 
Romania and Bulgaria, were reformed through parametric adjustments. 
It shows that, small or parametric reforms had large consequences both for the 
generosity of pension benefits as well as for the institutional architecture of the 
pension systems. Comparing two similar countries, Romania and Bulgaria, the paper 
finds that the small adjustments passed in each country in response to short-term 
economic and political pressures, have led to an increased divergence between the 
two welfare states. It finds that in Bulgaria, the pension system has become fiscally 
unsustainable under the current regime of extremely small contribution rates, coupled 
with austere benefits and a large private pillar. The paper also finds that since pension 
benefits have become less and less generous, pensioners are heavily affected by 
poverty. In contrast, in Romania the pension system has remained more generous as 
contribution rates have remained relatively high. The generosity of pensions 
recovered especially after 2005, a period when the country experienced high levels of 
economic growth which allowed political parties to compete through promises 
pension increases. 
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Table 1. An overview of the paper contributions by the four papers. 
Paper title Main Research Questions Country 
Selection 
Data Sources Main Findings 
From State to Market and Back: 
The Politics and Economics of 
Pension Privatization in Eastern 
Europe 
What explains variation in 
pension privatization outcomes 
in Eastern Europe? 
18 
Eastern 
European 
countries  
Own coding of the 
dependent variable, 
Quality of Government 
database 
Political regime type → privatization 
Right-wing governments → larger 
mandatory funded pillars 
Economic crises → negative impact 
privatization 
Reforming against all odds: 
Multi-pillar pension systems in 
the Czech Republic and 
Romania 
Why some countries opted for 
the introduction of private pillars 
at a time when others were 
scaling back the reform? 
Czech 
Republic; 
Romania 
International and domestic 
statistical databanks; 
Semi-structured expert 
interviews. 
Right-wing parties → mandatory 
funded pillar reforms 
Late reformers → limited learning 
From Austerity to Austerity: 
The Political Economy of 
Public Pension Reforms in 
Romania and Bulgaria 
What are the consequences of 
public pension parametric 
reforms in the two countries? 
What explains divergence in 
reform outcomes? 
Romania; 
Bulgaria 
International and domestic 
statistical databanks; 
Semi-structured expert 
interviews. 
Parametric pension reforms →short 
term concerns 
Parametric adjustments → unintended 
consequences 
What about the non-reformers? 
The political economy of 
pension reforms in Belarus and 
Ukraine. 
Why some countries avoided 
pension privatization altogether? 
What pension reform 
alternatives have they opted for? 
Belarus; 
Ukraine 
International and domestic 
statistical databanks; 
Semi-structured expert 
interviews. 
Opening of political regime →pension 
privatization 
International influence → long-term 
retrenchment 
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The paper thus outlines how two apparently similar welfare states have increasingly 
diverged as a result of the cumulative pension system adjustments that were passed by 
governments in response to short term political and economic pressures. The paper 
also shows that the regulatory capacity of the state played a key role in how workers 
reacted to retrenchment. In the case of Bulgaria, fears of retrenchment, and especially 
higher retirement ages in the future, coupled with the lack of capacity of the state to 
regulate entry into early retirement allowed workers to escape into early retirement in 
massive numbers, a move that had major fiscal consequences for the public pension 
system. 
The last paper builds on the empirical findings of the first paper regarding the effects 
of the political regime type on pension reforms, and seeks to explain pension reform 
outcomes in two countries that did not privatize: Belarus and Ukraine. It shows that, 
the political regime type indeed impacted how the two countries reacted to the 
pension privatization agenda promoted by the WB as well as what parametric 
adjustments they used for managing their public pension systems. In contrast with the 
veto-actor literature, it finds that authoritarian regimes do not reform more their 
pension systems but, on the contrary, avoid both to openly retrench their public 
pension systems as well as to introduce mandatory private accounts. 
Furthermore, the paper finds that the opening up of the political regime in Ukraine 
was associated with a shift in the pension reform policy. Like the majority of its 
regional peers, the country sought to privatize its pension system but the reform failed 
as electoral competition generated by the regime change relied more a more on 
promises of pension benefit increases.  This made the public PAYG pension system to 
become fiscally unsustainable as competition through pension increases generated 
large budget deficits. The paper thus argues that in the case of the competitive-
 35 
 
authoritarian regime that emerged in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, the 
pension system was captured by parties seeking to use it in order to gain electoral 
advantages over their competitors. The paper shows that, in the case of Ukraine 
pension generosity shifted from a radical austerity phase in the 1990s to a radical 
generosity phase in the mid’ 2000s, financed through a series of government 
mandated increases in benefit levels. Importantly, it also shows that IFIs have sought 
to directly influence pension policy making in Ukraine by forcing parties into passing 
electorally sensitive reforms such as increases in the retirement ages for women.  
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Abstract
During the past two decades, Eastern European governments have
increasingly opted for assigning a greater responsibility to market
forces in the area of old age provision. Before the Great Recession,
the privatization of pension systems became one of the most widely
accepted solutions to the problem of ageing in the region and around
the world. However, the fiscal problems that governments faced as a
result of the crisis, have shaken the political support for the reform
and consequently have sparked a wave of policy reversals that ranged
from temporary cut-backs in second pillar contribution rates, to full
scale nationalizations of funds' assets. In this paper we ask what
factors account the decisions to introduce and then roll back private
pension pillars. Using a data-set that covers both privatizing and
non-privatizing Eastern European countries between 1995 and 2014,
we estimate a zero one inflated beta regression model to account for
the degree of pension privatization. Our results show that domestic
political and economic variables best account for variation in reform
outcomes. We find evidence that the degree of pension privatization
is shaped by the political regime type, with democracies being on
average more likely to have larger second pillars. However, authori-
tarian regimes are more likely to opt for policy extremes: choosing
either to entirely reject privatization or to fully privatize their pen-
sion systems.
1Electronic address: adascaliteid@ceu.edu
2Electronic address: vegettif@ceu.edu
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Introduction
The wave of pension privatizations1 that swept Eastern Europe since 1998,
represents an unprecedented attempt to introduce market principles in wel-
fare provision. Promoted by international actors, such as the World Bank,
and supported by reformist national political elites, the policy has rapidly
spread across a diverse set of political and economic contexts. Its impressive
appeal was fostered by the belief that cutting back the state interference
with pension provision will solve both present and future fiscal problems
that public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems were facing. As World
Bank (1994) argued, pension privatization could contribute to securing a
fairer distribution of the retirement burden between generations, reduce
political interference in pension benefit provision, and, in the long run,
provide a solution to the emerging fiscal crisis of the welfare state triggered
by population ageing.
By the time the financial crisis of 2008 hit the region, thirteen Eastern
European countries had adopted the reform, albeit to different extents.
Variation in the implementation of pension privatization ranged from full
privatization of public pension assets in Kazakhstan, to partial privati-
zation in most of the Central and Eastern European countries, and failed
attempts to introduce the policy in Ukraine or outright rejection of the pol-
icy in Belarus (Adascalitei and Domonkos, 2015; Orenstein, 2008). More
so, the crisis itself represented a turning point in the spread of pension pri-
vatization. A wave of privatization reversals has been implemented across
the region, ranging from full nationalizations of private pension funds in
Hungary and Kazakhstan to cutting back contribution rates in Poland and
Romania (Drahokoupil and Domonkos, 2012; Zhandildin, 2015). Thus,
the redesign of Eastern European pension systems involved a remarkable
variation in institutional outcomes during both the expansion and the con-
traction phase of the policy.
In this paper we take stock of the full range of privatization outcomes
and begin by explaining why some countries opted for partial privatization
while others have opted for rejecting the policy altogether. In a second
step, we analyse the sub-sample of privatizing countries, and explain why
some countries opted for larger second-pillars. Our results show that the
type of the political regime matters for whether a country opted for pen-
sion privatization or not. We find that democratic regimes are on average
more likely to opt for the reform. Furthermore, we find evidence that au-
thoritarian regimes are more likely to opt for extreme policy cases of policy
1Pension privatization refers to the total or partial replacement of public pension
systems with mandatory private accounts following the pillar model proposed by the
World Bank in its seminal 1994 report, Averting the Old Age Crisis.
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reforms: opting for either full privatization of public pension systems of
complete rejection of the reform. We argue that the extreme outcomes of
reforms in the case of authoritarian regimes are the result of discretionary
choices by power holders. In the case of partial privatization outcomes, we
find that, when in government, right-wing parties have supported larger
second pillars, while left-wing parties have no effect on the size of second
pillars.
Variations of the Pension Privatization Policy
in Eastern Europe
The spread of pension privatization in Eastern Europe provided an impor-
tant case of welfare state change that focused scholarly attention on the
political actors and actor constellations that could shape the direction of
reforms. Case study research, seeking to explain the political processes that
led countries to opt for privatization showed that both the decision-making
dynamics as well as the actors involved in political bargaining mattered
for reform outcomes. At the same time, comparative analysis studying
the political and economic factors that the way for the privatization public
pension systems in Eastern Europe has underlined either the role played by
domestic actors or the power excerpted by liberalizing international elites.
Domestic power holders matter both because of their position in the decision-
making process as well as because of their ideological preferences regarding
pension reforms. Since pension privatization is a costly reform that impacts
the interests of different stakeholders, the number of veto players involved
in the reform can influence its outcome. Indeed, as Brooks (2002) notes, in
highly fragmented political systems, reform minded governments might shy
away from costly welfare reforms because of the low likelihood of creating
a consensus around it. Highly fragmented executives, or executives fac-
ing highly fragmented legislative bodies will therefore update their reform
agenda and give up on contentious proposals, opting instead for alterna-
tives that are less costly in terms of political resources. Similarly, Orenstein
(1999) finds that, while partially driven by path dependent fiscal problems,
pension privatization outcomes depend on the number of veto actors that
participate in deliberations during the proposal stage of the reform, with
countries where less actors were involved in the reform having passed larger
second pillars.
Other scholars have focused on how the ideological preferences of vari-
ous veto players impact their support for pension privatization. Müller
(1999, 2003) analyses the interactions between the Ministries of Finance
43
and Labour, pointing that pension privatization did not succeed when the
Ministry of Finance was not involved in the reform. While the former in-
stitutional actor favoured a market based solution to pension reform due to
the growing fiscal deficit of the state managed pension scheme, the latter
preferred to promote the use of parametric pension system adjustments,
that would preserve the institutional architecture of the inherited schemes.
The Ministry of Labour often-times defended the public pension systems
because it catered to many of its constituents that had an interest in pre-
serving the status quo (bureaucratic elites within the ministry, public sector
trade unions or other statist associations). However, in reality, this clear
division between the preferences of the two ministries did not emerge in
all cases of pension privatization in Eastern Europe, or, in some instances,
it was even entirely reversed, with the Ministry of Labour assuming the
leading role in promoting pension privatization (Arza and Kohli, 2007).
The pervasiveness of the reform was instead ensured by the presence of
liberalizing elites within the cadres of most of the state institutions. These
elites tended to endorse welfare restructuring and retrenchment as part
of the macroeconomic stabilization programmes promoted by executives
under the guidance of International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Further-
more, they drew their political support from the newly formed political
parties, whose stance on pension and welfare reforms was in most cases
unclear. On the one hand, some scholars (Careja and Emmenegger, 2009;
Lipsmeyer, 2002) argue that the traditional left-right divide can explain
welfare reform outcomes, with left parties being more likely to support
higher welfare expenditure and right-wing parties supporting retrenchment.
On the other other hand, these effects are contested by findings which show
that in Eastern Europe, left wing parties adopt a right-wing policy posi-
tion in the welfare domain in order to prove their attachment to the new
political systems that emerged after the downfall of socialism (Tavits and
Letki, 2009). Thus, left wing parties often-times supported fiscal auster-
ity measures whereas right-wing parties have been more likely to advance
welfare enhancing policies.
The reversed roles assumed by left and right parties in pension and welfare
reforms, also suggests that elite support for privatization is not bounded
by party lines and is instead connected with the costs and benefits that
various interest groups can extract from the reform or its absence. Thus,
with the exception of nationalist or unreformed left parties, whose position
has been constantly against pension privatization, both the social democrat
left-wing parties and right wing parties have alternated in their stance
towards the reform, depending on the interest groups that they catered
for. As Armeanu (2010) notes, the issue of pension policy reform reflects
only partially the left-right dimension and is instead better explained by
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the coalitions between partisan and non-partisan interest groups. Thus,
parties tend to support pension privatization when their interests converge
with those of interest groups from the financial industry such as banks
or insurance companies. By comparison, they will reject the privatization
of pensions when their interests are aligned with those groups that hold
an interest in the pension privileges that exists under the state managed
system. In general these groups are represented by public sector workers
such as the police, the army, or the heavy industry employees who have an
interest in preserving generous public occupational pension systems.
Their effectiveness in promoting the individualization of welfare policies
varied significantly across countries, depending on whether liberalizing elites
had unconstrained power in pushing for reforms (Cook, 2007). Thus, in
cases where governments could pass rapid non-negotiated liberalizing re-
forms, pension privatization was accomplished with little opposition. In
contrast, in countries where power was dispersed, pension privatization
achieved much less. This suggests that in less politically accountable
regimes, the pension privatization will proceed faster due to its insula-
tion from outside interests. Still, the empirical evidence on the impact of
regime type on pension privatization is mixed. On the one hand, some
suggest that in non-democratic regimes privatization is more likely to pro-
ceed because autocrats can bypass societal interests. Indeed, case study
evidence from authoritarian regimes such as Chile or Kazakhstan seems
to point out that, indeed autocracies are more likely to pursue the reform
(Brooks, 2002; Orenstein, 1999).
However, a look at the entire set of Eastern European countries suggests
that the impact of the regime type on pension reforms is more complex than
the literature suggests. First, with the exception of Kazakhstan, where the
state system has been entirely replaced by a market-based one, no author-
itarian regime has followed the Chilean example. In fact, the success of
pension privatization within the sample of East European authoritarian
regimes has varied greatly, with most countries rejecting the policy en-
tirely. Second, hybrid or competitive-authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and
Way, 2010) have also varied in their support for the privatization. Third, in
the aftermath of the financial crisis, a variety of policy reversals have been
passed in Eastern Europe, with countries where governments could by-
pass societal interests, introducing larger or full reversals. Amongst them,
Kazakhstan, the former poster-child of the privatization supporters, and
Hungary, have entirely nationalized private pensions.
Furthermore, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have been involved
in promoting the individualization public pensions, especially during the
first wave of privatizations. In particular, the World Bank (WB) has ad-
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vanced the privatization agenda by using both hard and soft power re-
sources. WB has exercised its hard power mainly through conditionalities
attached to loans for countries that faced fiscal and debt crises. However,
the influence exercised through loan conditionalities was problematic as
countries have often-times simply avoided to obey the conditions attached
to international loans (Orenstein, 2008). In comparison, soft power in-
terventions, using the spread of ideas as vehicles for policy influence have
been received with less opposition by local policy entrepreneurs (Béland
and Orenstein, 2013). The well-known WB campaign that promoted pen-
sion privatization around the world employed a combination of coercion
and campaigning in order to exert influence on national policies.
While IFIs have clearly promoted the introduction of mandatory private
accounts in the 1990s, during the first wave of reforms, more recently they
have re-evaluated their support for the policy. The WB diminished its
advocacy for the policy primarily because of doubts raised about the effec-
tiveness of the policy from its own experts (Béland and Orenstein, 2013).
As a result, the spread of pension privatization in the region came to a halt
around mid 2000s and was replaced by a shift in international support for
less radical solutions to pension reforms. These included recommending
parametric pension reforms such as raising retirement ages, strengthen-
ing the link between contributions and benefits or promoting active ageing
(Chawla et al., 2007).
Hypotheses
As evidenced in the previous section, the literature remains split over the
effects of many of the factors thought to contribute to the spread of pen-
sion privatization. Given the changing nature of economic and political
conditions in the region, as well as the diversity of privatization outcomes
both before and after the economic crisis, there were only few attempts
at arriving at general statements about the determinants of privatization
that aim to provide a systematic explanation of reform outcomes in the
wider sample of Eastern European countries. Importantly, while the focus
of most of the analyses has been on why some of the countries in the region
have opted for pension privatization, there is comparatively less attention
paid to non-privatizers. To fill these gaps, our analysis includes both priva-
tizing and non-privatizing countries on a period that spans between 1995
and 2014.
Our first hypothesis concerns the role of right wing parties in pension pri-
vatization. Drawing on the wider literature that discusses partisan effects
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on pension privatization, we expect that right wing parties will be more
likely to promote the policy, given their preferences for promoting market
mechanisms in welfare state provisions. Since privatization was widely ad-
vocated in Eastern Europe as a cost neutral measure, that did not have
immediate redistributive consequences for workers, we expect that right
wing parties will support the policy.
Hypothesis 1: Right wing governments will increase the likelihood of pen-
sion privatization.
Secondly, we expect that, once in place, right wing parties will be more
likely to defend the existent private pension systems. The literature re-
mains ambiguous on the stances that right-wing parties take regarding the
size of the second pillars, with case-study evidence showing both negative
and positive affects in different countries. However, since right-wing parties
are more likely to reject state involvement in welfare state provision and
protect the individualization of welfare services, we expect that they will
protect the existent arrangements.
Hypothesis 2: In privatizing countries, right wing governments will sup-
port larger second pillars.
Furthermore, we also expect that debt crises will have positive affect on
the likelihood to privatize pensions. Crises impact the fiscal condition of
public budgets and are usually accompanied by expenditure cuts and re-
trenchment. At the same time, economic crises exposed the poor fiscal
situation of social security budgets that, in spite of the high contribution
rates were running fiscal deficits while paying very low pension benefits.
Thus, crises provided the supporters of pension privatization with a polit-
ical opportunity to pursue their agenda, given that both workers and pen-
sioners perceived the public pension system as dysfunctional. Therefore,
crises episodes exacerbated the "negative consensus" on the deficiencies of
state managed pensions and provided reformers with a mandate to shift
towards private alternatives (Brooks, 2006).
Hypothesis 3: The higher the external debt, the higher the likelihood of
privatization.
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Contrary to the theories inspired by the "veto player" arguments, which
predict that non-democratic regimes will be more likely to opt for pension
privatization, we argue that more democratic regimes will be more likely
to pass the reform. This expectation is driven both by case study evidence,
which shows that democracies in the region have been more successful in
passing the reform. At the same time, we expect that more democratic
regimes are more likely to pass the reform because of their desire to catch-
up with developed economies. As a result, they are more susceptible to
pass favour policies that are close to the position of international actors.
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of pension privatization is greater in more
democratic countries.
Summing up, we expect that partisan effects will follow the traditional
left-right ideological divide, while regime effects will run against findings
stemming from the "veto player" frameworks. Moreover, we expect that
worsening economic conditions will have a positive impact on the policy,
with more indebted countries being more likely to pass the policy. In the
next sections we discuss our data and methodological strategy, followed by
a discussion of our findings. The last section of the paper concludes.
Data
Our dependent variable is the size of the second pillar, measured as the
share of the mandatory contributions to private accounts, relative to the
total pension contributions. Thus, our variable captures the size of the
private pillar relative to that of the state managed public pay-as-you-go
pension system. In comparison with studies that operationalize the adop-
tion of mandatory private accounts in dichotomous terms (Müller, 1999),
our dependent variable allows us to take into account the full gamut of in-
stitutional outcomes that dominated the pension policy making in Eastern
Europe. These outcomes include the expansionary phase of second pillars
that took place before the economic crisis of the late 2000s, the temporary
and permanent changes that were adopted during and after the crisis, as
well as the cases that avoided privatization altogether. As Figure 1 shows,
the relative size of the second pillar varies substantially across Eastern
European countries.
In this sense, our study builds on Brooks (2002) and proposes a continuous
measure of pension privatization. However, unlike Brooks (2002) we do
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not use an estimation of a worker's average income derived from the sec-
ond pillar for several reasons. First, as the crisis has shown, it is difficult
to predict the size of the second pillar since the policy has been unsta-
ble recently, with governments introducing numerous changes that concern
both the structure of the contributions as well as rules regarding wider
regulatory issues. Second, the fate of the private pillars in the region re-
mains a hotly debated political issue, that makes it impossible to predict
whether the system will survive in the future. To take just one example, the
most recent reformer, the Czech Republic has already began the process to
eliminate the second pillar starting from 2016 (Adascalitei and Domonkos,
2015). Third, in some countries, the regulatory framework of the second
pillar for the payout phase remains underdeveloped, making almost impos-
sible to predict how much income future pensioners will derive from their
private accounts.
We also use a set of independent variables to operationalize the adoption
and size of the second pillars. To capture the impact of the macroeconomic
conditions on the reform we use gross domestic product and the level of
external debt. While the first variable describes how second pillars react
to economic crises, the second shows to what extent governments used
external sources to cover their financing needs. Furthermore, following
Madrid (2005) we also include the size of the pension expenditures as a
share of the gross domestic product.
To test our hypothesis regarding the effect of political regimes types on the
likelihood to introduce private pillars, we include a measure of democra-
tization that ranks countries based on the characteristics of the political
authority. The revised version of the combined polity score, which we use,
represents a scale running from -10 (fully authoritarian regime) to 10 ( fully
democratic regime) that provides an index for the characteristics of the po-
litical regime. This is an ideal measure for our sample of countries, since
many are neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic regimes. Rather,
they combine characteristics of both types of political regimes, generating
competitive authoritarian political regimes in which formal democratic in-
stitutions exist but are altered in order to allow incumbents to preserve or
gain more power (Levitsky and Way, 2010).
Furthermore, we also include two measures of government ideology that
take into account, first, whether the executive is left-wing or right-wing,
and second, how ideologically homogeneous the coalition supporting the
executive at the legislative level is. Operationally, we take two dummy
variables indicating whether the executive is "left-wing" or "right-wing"
(with "center" being the baseline category) and multiply them by the share
of legislative seats owned by parties of the same ideological color. Hence, for
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instance, in case of a single-party right-wing government, the executive will
be supported by a 100% homogeneous coalition, and our variable will have
value 1 for an ideologically-coherent right-wing executive. Alternatively,
when a right-wing executive is supported by a coalition made of a right-
wing party owning 70% of the seats and a left-wing or center party owning
30% of the seats, the variable will have value 0.7. In both cases, the second
variable indicating whether the executive is left-wing will have value 0.2
Modeling Pension Systems: A Zero-One In-
flated Beta Model
To test our hypotheses we use a zero-one inflated beta (henceforth ZOIB)
regression model with random intercepts at the country level (see Liu and
Li, 2014). We argue that a ZOIB regression is ideal to model the size
of the second pillar for different reasons, both statistical and conceptual.
Statistically, we need to take into account the fact that our response vari-
able is a fraction, and therefore its possible values are bounded between
zero and one. This implies that, first, modeling it as a linear function
of the explanatory variables might produce out-of-bound predictions, and
second, its variance depends on the conditional mean (Cox, 1996; Papke
and Wooldridge, 1996). Hence, using a linear regression estimated via OLS
is likely to produce estimates that are both biased and inconsistent (Cook
et al., 2008).
However, while statistical concerns are important, the main reason to use
a ZOIB model is that it is a more suitable option given the data gener-
ating process of the dependent variable than other available alternatives.
Conceptually, pension privatization can be regarded as a two-stage choice.
When moving from a status quo of fully-public pension systems, national
governments may decide, first, whether to privatize at all, and second, how
prominent the second pillar should be within a pension plan. In terms of
measurement, the step between a fully public pension plan and one that in-
cludes a private component of, say, 10%, is qualitatively different from the
same increment occurring when part of the pension plan has already been
privatized before. In the former case privatization has a greater symbolic
value, as it represents a real "paradigm shift" from the previous system
2We take both the measure of executive ideology and the seat shares of the gov-
ernment coalition parties from the Quality of Government database (see Teorell et al.,
2015). Note that the QoG data allow us to observe the ideological direction and the
seat share for the three largest coalition partners only. While this limit might introduce
noise in our measurement, we have no reason to believe that this should systematically
bias our results in a given direction.
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(Orenstein, 2013). Moreover, it requires establishing a brand new adminis-
trative infrastructure, which will be already in place for future adjustments
of the pension plan (World Bank, 1994). For these reasons, a reform intro-
ducing privatization should be more sensitive, and therefore prompt more
accurate scrutiny from the veto players, than one expanding it. The same
argument applies to the inverse process, i.e. the choice to make the pension
system fully public versus simply decreasing the private component. Both
of these are discrete choices, and should be treated differently from the
choices to increase or decrease the share devoted to the second pillar in an
already-privatized system.
In terms of measurement, this process introduces a discontinuity in the
distribution of the dependent variable, generating a non-negligible amount
of zeros.3 These cases include the countries in our sample which never
privatized, such as Albania, Belarus, Slovenia and Ukraine, as well as all
the years of observation where other countries have not yet (or not anymore)
adopted a private pillar. These are not "sampling zeros", i.e. accidents of
the sample whereas the true probability in the population has a non-zero
value, but rather "structural zeros", i.e. observations where the true value
is indeed a zero. Moreover, our sample also contains a few values stacked
on the upper limit of the 01 range: the observations from Kazakhstan
between 1998 and 2012, where the systems was fully privatized. While
this scenario is the exact opposite to the one behind the zero outcomes,
the process producing such outcomes is likely to be similar: going for a
fully-private pension system is a discrete choice, and should be treated
separately from the rest of the fractional observations.4 Thus, in sum, the
data generating process of our response variable is composed of three parts:
one part determining the probability to have a pension system with at least
a private component against the probability to have a fully-public one; a
second part determining the size of the private component (among the
systems that privatized to some extent); and a third part determining the
probability to have a fully-private pension system against the probability
to have a pension system at least partially public.
The ZOIB model takes into account the threefold nature of our dependent
variable by assuming that the data are generated by a piecewise mixed
distribution defined as:
3See Figure 4 in Appendix B for a visualization of the distribution of the dependent
variable.
4A peculiarity of Kazakhstan, well shown in Figure 1, is that the pension system has
always been either 100% public or 100% private. While this strengthens our argument
about the discrete or "categorical" nature of the 01 values, it also raises legitimate
doubts regarding the comparability of the choice process between Kazakhstan and the
remaining countries. Therefore, as a robustness check, we will repeat our analyses
excluding Kazakhstan from the sample.
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f(y|p, q, µ, φ) =

p if y = 0,
(1− p)q if y = 1,
(1− p)(1− q)g(y|µ, φ) if 0 < y < 1
where p is the probability to observe a value of zero (i.e. the pension plan
is fully public), q is the probability to observe a value of one (i.e. the
pension plan is fully private), and g(y|µ, φ) is the density function of the
beta distribution given the mean µ and the precision parameter φ. The
two boundary values 0 and 1 are typically assumed to follow a Bernoulli
distribution, and therefore their probabilities p and q can be modeled in
the same way as in other common regression models where the dependent
variable is a dichotomy. However, the beta part of the model requires a
somewhat more complex parametrization.
The beta distribution is a very flexible probability function governed by
two shape parameters, α and β. These parameters can take only positive
values, and their combination determines whether the distribution has a
unimodal, bimodal, uniform, symmetric or asymmetric shape.5 Moreover,
α and β determine both the mean and dispersion/precision of the distri-
bution. More specifically, the mean is given by:
E(y) = µ =
α
α + β
where α, β > 0, the variance is given by:
V ar(y) =
µ(1− µ)
α + β + 1
and the precision is defined as φ = α + β. In general, when µ is constant,
a larger value of φ indicates a lower variance, hence the name "precision
parameter". However, knowing its value provides meaningful information
only when the mean is taken into account as well. This parametrization
shows that the variance depends on the conditional mean, as it is usually the
case with bounded distributions, and that both mean and variance depend
on α and β. While early studies applying regression on beta-distributed
variables linked the predictors directly to the two shape parameters (e.g.
Brehm and Gates, 1993), more recent applications focused on modeling
the mean and, when needed, the precision (see Ferrari and Cribari-Neto,
2004; Kieschnick and McCullough, 2003; Paolino, 2001; Simas et al., 2010;
5See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of the beta distribution and some visual
examples of how different parameter values convert to different shapes.
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Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006). This is more convenient as researchers are
typically interested, as in our case, to know the effect of different predictors
on the mean of the dependent variable. We look here at the impact of our
predictors on three quantities: the probability to have a fully-public pension
system (p), the probability to have a fully-private pension system (q) and
the size of the second pillar (µ). These three parameters are linked to our
predictors via logit link functions, hence the coefficients can be interpreted
as log-odds.6
Next to the unusual shape of our dependent variable, our data also present
a complex structure with repeated observations nested within countries.
While one could reasonably argue that the extent of pension privatization
in Hungary is independent from the size of the second pillar in Poland,
this argument is hardly defendable when comparing values for Hungary in
different years. In other words, observations belonging to the same coun-
try will share more common information than observations belonging to
different countries. Failing to take into account the non-independence be-
tween observations from the same higher-level units typically results in
overconfidence regarding the amount of information at our disposal, pro-
ducing smaller error terms. Hence, we specify a mixed-effects model with
observations clustered within countries and a random component on the
intercepts.7
Once implemented, pension reforms usually stay in place for several years,
and the following adjustments usually build on previous reforms. That
is to say, pension reforms are not renegotiated every year as if it were
the first. As a consequence, the data generating process of our dependent
variable at any given time point is dependent on its past value. This process
generates autocorrelation, and it is likely to produce biased estimates of the
effects of the predictors. To take this into account, we introduce among the
predictors a lagged dependent variable, that is, the size of the second pillar
on the year prior the one considered. While this is likely to produce very
conservative estimates of our parameters (Achen, 2000), it is also necessary
in our case, given the severe autocorrelation of our response variable.8
In sum, our ZOIB model is made of four equations:
6We choose not to model φ because we have no theoretical reasons why our predictors
should have an impact on the precision of the beta portion of our data. However, the
ZOIB model will estimate by default an intercept for φ, that is its value when all
predictors have value zero. The default link function for φ is the log function.
7We assume that the effect of the other predictors is fixed because we have no theo-
retical reasons to expect their impact on the response variable to be context-dependent.
8The Pearson correlation between the size of the second pillar measured at time t0
and at time t−1 is about 0.9.
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logit(µij) = (β0,1 + uj) + β1,1Lag DVij + βN,1XNij
logit(pij) = (β0,2 + uj) + β1,2Lag DVij + βN,2XNij
logit(qij) = β0,3 + β1,3Lag DVij + βN,3XNij
log(φij) = β0,4
Where XN are the independent variables discussed in the previous section,
and uj ∼ N(0, σ2) is the random component associated to the intercepts of
the models for µ and p.9 We do not include the random term in the model
for q as in our sample the only country in which we observe a fully-private
pension system is Kazakhstan, hence assuming that the baseline probability
to observe a value of 1 is randomly distributed across countries would be
unrealistic. Moreover, given this characteristic of our data, we do not wish
to generalize the findings regarding the effect of our predictors on q to any
other country beyond Kazakhstan. Therefore, assuming that the intercept
has a country-level fixed effect is more appropriate than estimating such
an effect as if it were random (see Searle et al., 1992). The first three
equations predict, respectively, the "proportion" of the second pillar within
the pension system (µ), when the second pillar is bigger then 0 and smaller
than 1, the probability that the pension system is fully public (p), and
the probability that it is fully private (q). All three equations include the
intercept, the lagged dependent variable, and a set of N predictors. The
fourth equation predicts the dispersion of the beta portion of the model
(φ), and it includes only the intercept.
We estimate our model in a bayesian framework using the ZOIB package for
R (Liu and Kong, 2015; Liu and Li, 2014).10 Bayesian models differ from
models estimated via maximum likelihood in that they require the specifi-
cation of a set of priors for our parameters, i.e. a set of values reflecting
our belief regarding the parameter effects before the data are taken into
9Note that the distribution of uj is assumed to be the same across both equations,
hence the model estimates only one value for σ2. This is a restriction of the current
version of the software package used to estimate the model. However, we do not think
that this represents a big problem, for the link functions are the same across the two
models and therefore the distribution of the linear predictors is on the same scale.
10The results shown in this paper have been obtained using the ZOIB package version
1.2 and the rjags package version 3-14 ran on R version 3.1.2. Moreover we used the
software JAGS version 3.3.0.
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account.11 Since we do not have any prior knowledge about the parame-
ter effects in our population we adopt uninformative priors, that is, prior
distributions with great uncertainties which assign equal probability to a
wide range of possible parameter values.12 This implies that, when infor-
mation in the data is scarce (because of a limited number of observations),
a bayesian model will weigh more on the priors to estimate the coefficients,
i.e. it will assign greater importance to our existing belief regarding the
effect of the predictors because the new information at our disposal does
not provide enough leverage to "change our mind". However, since the
priors are themselves highly uncertain, the model will produce very wide
confidence intervals. This property makes bayesian estimation particularly
advisable when, like in this present case, the multilevel structure of the
data is taken into account in the modeling but the number of higher-level
units is limited (Stegmueller, 2013).
Findings and Discussion
The results of the model are shown in Table 1. The coefficients represent
posterior means of the model parameters. Bayesian models do not produce
single point estimates of the parameter values, but rather distributions of
possible values, called posterior distributions. These consist of the prior
distributions that we have set before looking at the data (with mean zero
and very large dispersion) updated taking into account the information
contained in the data. To extract the results, we drew a large number
of MCMC samples from the posterior distributions and stored the values.
Next to the means, Table 1 also reports the 95% and 90% credible intervals,
namely the ranges containing, respectively, 95% and 90% of the values
sampled from the posterior distributions.13
The model results confirm some of our expectations, but also reveal some
counterintuitive findings. Three things are worth noting. First, our Hy-
pothesis 3 regarding the positive effect of the external debt is confirmed
with a probability greater than 0.95. This finding corroborates earlier ev-
idence on the impact of external debt on countries' choice for introducing
11See Jackman (2009) for a general discussion of bayesian estimation and its applica-
tions to social science data.
12We use the default prior specifications of the ZOIB package, that is, diffuse normal
priors with mean 0 and precision 10−3 for all the intercept and slope coefficients, and a
half-Cauchy prior with scale parameter 20 for σ2.
13For every parameter we drew two chains of 52,000 MCMC samples each, discarded
the first 2,000 to allow the Markov chains to reach an equilibrium, and stored one value
out of 50. The results reported in this section summarize the 2,000 parameter values
stored with this process.
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Table 1: ZOIB model results. 95% and 90% credible intervals are reported in
parentheses below the mean coefficients. Bold coefficients differ from zero in at
least 90% of the cases.
Proportion P(Y=0) P(Y=1)
Intercept -0.869 6.167 59.02
(-2.146; 0.787) (3.671; 8.893) (-67.58; 188.441)
(-1.968; 0.488) (4.106; 8.42) (-43.533; 167.829)
Lagged DV 2.374 -19.984 -11.045
(1.537; 3.203) (-25.571; -15.348) (-140.083; 118.645)
(1.687; 3.072) (-24.491; -16.009) (-116.742; 99.439)
GDP growth (t-1) 0.012 -0.088 0.201
(-0.009; 0.035) (-0.18; -0.001) (-3.893; 5.482)
(-0.006; 0.03) (-0.165; -0.014) (-3.27; 4.491)
Debt (t-1) -0.002 -0.017 -0.068
(-0.006; 0.002) (-0.032; -0.002) (-0.935; 0.655)
(-0.006; 0.001) (-0.03; -0.005) (-0.805; 0.555)
Pension expenditure -0.011 0.013 -6.604
(-0.097; 0.069) (-0.157; 0.2) (-19.987; 5.995)
(-0.081; 0.055) (-0.135; 0.172) (-17.377; 3.748)
Democratization -0.08 -0.407 -8.394
(-0.208; 0.028) (-0.675; -0.171) (-16.016; -2.155)
(-0.186; 0.007) (-0.637; -0.205) (-14.739; -2.906)
Ideologically Coherent 0.364 1.378 13.804
Right-wing Executive (0.078; 0.654) (-0.037; 2.803) (-95.956; 104.019)
(0.122; 0.613) (0.199; 2.551) (-76.417; 90.124)
Ideologically Coherent 0.14 0.468 -31.253
Left-wing Executive (-0.092; 0.388) (-0.668; 1.609) (-113.92; 28.831)
(-0.058; 0.35) (-0.485; 1.437) (-98.991; 20.896)
Intercept log(φ) 3.574
(3.294; 3.844)
(3.337; 3.8)
σ2 0.137
(0.005; 0.562)
(0.012; 0.398)
N observations 330
N countries 18
private pillars (Müller, 1999). In addition, we find that economic crises
as measured by the rate of growth of GDP, increase the likelihood of pen-
sion privatization. Generally, when the external debt is high, governments
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promote market-oriented reforms as a way to access international financial
resources as well as in order to signal their commitment for reforms that
were agreed with their creditors. In this respect, the adoption of second
pillars can help in boosting the credibility of governments (Müller, 2002).14
Second, the impact of government ideology on pension privatization in
Eastern Europe is more complex than previously hypothesized. To un-
derstand this effect, Figure 2 shows the predicted probability to have a
fully-public pension system (left panel) and the predicted proportion of
the second pillar (right panel) in three different scenarios of executive ide-
ology. The dots are the single predictions based on the values sampled
from the posterior distributions, and the box plots show the mean and the
inter-quartile range. The predictions refer to a situation where all the other
variables are set to the average, apart from the left-wing executive variable,
which is set to zero. Hence, a value of 0 for the right-wing executive vari-
able means that the executive is ideologically on the center. A value of 0.5
means that the executive is ideologically right-wing, and supported in the
legislature by a government with 50% of the seats belonging to right-wing
parties. A value of 1 means that the executive is right-wing and supported
by a 100% right-wing government. The figure shows a substantial increase
in the probability to have a fully-public pension system, which raises from
an average of less than 50% when the executive is ideologically center, to
an average of 75% when there is a right-wing executive supported by an
ideologically homogeneous government. Much smaller is the effect on the
size of the second pillar, which increases of about 9 percentage points on
average in between the two scenarios.
These results suggest that, on the one hand, ideologically consistent right-
wing governments are more likely to increase the size of the second pillar
once privatization has been adopted. This finding confirms our second Hy-
pothesis and is in line with expectations derived from traditional theories of
partisan effects on welfare spending, which suggest that Eastern European
countries are not different from their Western counterparts (Careja and
Emmenegger, 2009). On the other hand, the same types of government are
more likely to maintain a fully-public pension system. The finding refutes
our first hypothesis and suggests that, despite the fact that pension priva-
tization is ideologically consistent with right-wing ideology, when in power,
right-wing parties will avoid investing resources in pushing for the reform.
Politically, the strategy of avoiding to support the introduction of private-
pillars might be preferred by right-wing governments because the reform is
politically costly, involving a large amount of political capital for advocat-
14Note, however, than when the model is executed excluding Kazakhstan from the
sample, the effect of debt is reduced to the point that is not distinguishable from zero
with a 90% of probability, as Table 2 in Appendix A shows.
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of fully-public pension system and size of the sec-
ond pillar by ideological coherence of right-wing executive in Eastern Europe
ing, negotiating, and then implementing it. At the same time, right-wing
governments might not need to prove their commitment for market oriented
reforms, and, therefore will concentrate on passing policies that involve the
mobilization of fewer political resources (Tavits and Letki, 2009).
Taken together our findings on the effects of ideology on second pillar re-
forms show that there is no single mechanism that explains the introduction
and maintenance of second pillars in Eastern Europe. In fact, our findings
suggest that although support for the policy is rather scarce in its incipient
phases, once in place, it does create its own constituents. In addition, we
do not find any effects of left-wing ideology neither on the likelihood to
privatize nor on the size of the second pillars. The lack of effect of left-
wing ideology on second pillar reform outcomes, is echoed in the literature
which shows that left-wing governments did not have consistent preference
towards pension privatization (Armeanu, 2010). For example, while in the
case of the Polish second pillar reform, the proposal came from a left-wing
coalition government, in the Slovak case of the left has consistently op-
posed the reform and sought to reverse it once it came to power (Naczyk
and Domonkos, 2015).
A third important finding is that higher levels of democracy increase the
likelihood to privatize a country's pension system, as argued in Hypothesis
4. Figure 3 plots the predictions for each posterior sample across the range
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of fully-public pension system by level of democracy
in Eastern Europe
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of the "polity2" variable, with the bright line representing the mean across
all samples. As the shows, when the score of our democracy indicator goes
from the minimum to the maximum value in our data, the probability to
have a fully-public pension system drops from an average higher than 95%
to an average below 20%. This is a large effect, which confirms that more
democratic countries are substantially more likely than less democratic ones
to have a private pillar in their pension system.
Moreover, the case of Kazakhstan in our data suggests that more demo-
cratic countries are also less likely to adopt a fully private pension system.
To be sure, we shall refrain from discussing the results in the third column
of Table`1 in general terms, as those findings refer exclusively to Kaza-
khstan. However, other historical cases suggest that this pattern might be
meaningful in general terms. Chile, the poster child of pension pension pri-
vatization, displays similar features of political regime influence on reforms.
Under the authoritarian rule of Augusto Pinochet, the country adopted a
private pension scheme in 1981 that fully substituted the state managed
schemes. The reform was carried out with little consultation, while reform
opponents were ignored (Mesa-Lago and Müller, 2002).
Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed the political and economic determinants of
pension privatization reforms in Eastern Europe. We find that the like-
lihood of privatization is higher in more democratic countries and that
right-wing governments are likely to defend the private pillars, once these
are in place. In addition, we show that the level of external debt of a coun-
try does impact the likelihood of pension privatisation, but that the effect
depends on whether Kazakhstan is included in the sample. By comparison,
we find that economic crises have a positive and consistent impact on the
likelihood to introduce private pillars.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of pension
privatization reform in several ways. First, this is the first study that sys-
tematically analyses the determinants of pension privatization across the
wider sample of Eastern European countries. While many cross-national
comparative case studies have focused on various sub-sets of countries in
our sample, and mostly on the Western rim of Central Europe, no study has
attempted to advance general statements about the entire region. There-
fore, our study is a first step in understanding the determinants of pension
privatization reforms that takes into account the diversity of political and
economic regimes that emerged after the collapse of socialist regimes. Sec-
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ond, in order to capture the entire range of reforms, we use a dataset that
includes both reforming and non-reforming countries between 1995 and
2014. This is an important addition to the literature, since it captures
both the expansionary phase of privatization, as well as the period after
the economic crisis, when many reversals took place.
Finally, we use a relatively novel statistical method that allows us to dis-
tinguish between different types of pension reforms. While other studies
before investigated the impact of different predictors on the probability to
privatize and on the size of the second pillar (see Brooks, 2002) we provide a
more careful description of the data generating process by combining a beta
regression to model the proportion of the private pillar with dichotomous
models to predict the probability to have a fully-private and a fully-public
pension system. Our modeling strategy allows us to detect two important
patterns with respect to pension privatization in Eastern Europe. One is
the differential impact of right-wing governments on the likelihood to pri-
vatize and on the degree of private pension reform. This finding provides
an interesting case for the heterogeneous nature of right-wing governance
in East European countries, which urges for more research to be done to
better understand the core of right-wing ideology in the region. The second
interesting pattern that we find, albeit only suggestive at this point, is the
tendency of less democratic systems to make extreme choices in terms of
pension reforms, choosing either fully-public or fully-private systems. To
be sure, our data do not allow us to make generalizations regarding the
latter finding. However, they provide a robust piece of evidence that shall
inform future research focusing on the effect of democratization on social
policies.
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Appendix A Additional Tables
Table 2: ZOIB model results excluding Kazakhstan.
Proportion P(Y=0)
Intercept -1.531 6.685
(-2.362; -0.595) (3.626; 10.277)
(-2.239; -0.75) (4.051; 9.652)
Lagged DV 2.746 -34.072
(1.908; 3.539) (-46.228; -24.514)
(2.033; 3.413) (-44.276; -25.81)
GDP growth (t-1) 0.012 -0.109
(-0.008; 0.036) (-0.219; -0.006)
(-0.005; 0.031) (-0.2; -0.023)
Debt (t-1) -0.003 -0.012
(-0.007; 0.002) (-0.03; 0.005)
(-0.006; 0.001) (-0.026; 0.002)
Pension expenditure -0.009 -0.002
(-0.073; 0.051) (-0.194; 0.205)
(-0.062; 0.041) (-0.16; 0.173)
Democratization -0.023 -0.433
(-0.107; 0.053) (-0.796; -0.134)
(-0.091; 0.04) (-0.737; -0.169)
Ideologically Coherent 0.435 1.651
Right-wing Executive (0.156; 0.727) (-0.053; 3.596)
(0.2; 0.683) (0.214; 3.265)
Ideologically Coherent 0.15 0.387
Left-wing Executive (-0.081; 0.382) (-0.934; 1.729)
(-0.046; 0.348) (-0.693; 1.517)
Intercept log(φ) 3.490
(3.206; 3.741)
(3.25; 3.709)
σ2 0.033
(0.000; 0.140)
(0.000; 0.100)
N observations 312
N countries 17
Appendix B Descriptive Statistics
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Figure 4: Distribution of the size of the second pillar in the sample.
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Appendix C The Beta Distribution
α = 0.8; β = 5;
µ = 0.14; φ = 5.8; Var = 0.018
α = 1; β = 5;
µ = 0.17; φ = 6; Var = 0.02
α = 2; β = 5;
µ = 0.29; φ = 7; Var = 0.026
α = 3; β = 5;
µ = 0.38; φ = 8; Var = 0.026
α = 0.8; β = 0.8;
µ = 0.5; φ = 1.6; Var = 0.096
α = 1; β = 1;
µ = 0.5; φ = 2; Var = 0.083
α = 2; β = 2;
µ = 0.5; φ = 4; Var = 0.05
α = 5; β = 5;
µ = 0.5; φ = 10; Var = 0.023
α = 5; β = 0.8;
µ = 0.86; φ = 5.8; Var = 0.018
α = 5; β = 1;
µ = 0.83; φ = 6; Var = 0.02
α = 5; β = 2;
µ = 0.71; φ = 7; Var = 0.026
α = 5; β = 3;
µ = 0.62; φ = 8; Var = 0.026
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Figure 5: Beta distribution for several values of α and β and other parameters
The probability function of the beta distribution is:
P (y|α, β) = Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
y(α−1)(1− y)(β−1)
where α > 0, β > 0, and Γ() is the Gamma function. Moreover, the mean
of the beta distribution is given by:
E(y) = µ =
α
α + β
and the variance is given by:
V ar(y) =
µ(1− µ)
α + β + 1
Finally, the precision parameter φ that is estimated in beta regression mod-
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els is given by φ = α + β, so then α = µφ and β = (1− q)φ.
Figure 5 shows how different values of α and β affect the shape of the beta
distribution and, by extension, the values of the mean and the variance.
In general, when α > β the distribution is left (or negative) skewed, while
when β > α the distribution is right (or positive) skewed. When α = β the
distribution is symmetric, with a single mode when α = β > 1, two modes
when 0 < α = β < 1, and uniform when α = β = 115.
The figure also helps understand the relationship between the two shape
parameters, the mean µ, the precision φ, and the variance of the beta dis-
tribution. Moving from left to right in the top row, β is constant and equal
to 5 while the value of α goes from 0.8 to 3, hence the mean moves from
the lower bound towards the center and the precision increases. However,
since the variance is function of both µ and φ, its value increases as well.
Differently, in the middle row, the mean is always constant and equal to
0.5, while the value of the precision parameter gess from 1.6 to 10, hence
the variance decreases from about 0.096 to about 0.023.
15Note that the distribution can also be bimodal, albeit not symmetric, in all the cases
where 0 < α, β < 1 and α 6= β
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Paper 2: Reforming against all odds: Multi-pillar pension systems in 
the Czech Republic and Romania 
 
Adascalitei, D. and Domonkos, S. 2015. Reforming Against All Odds: The Introduction of Multi-
Pillar Pension Systems in the Czech Republic and Romania. International Social Security Review 
68 (2): 85–104. 
DOI: 10.1111/issr.12066 
 
Abstract  
Attempts to replace pay-as-you-go pension schemes with private funded systems came to a halt in 
Central and Eastern Europe after 2005. However, more recently, the region has witnessed two 
belated reformers: the Czech Republic and Romania. Both countries decided to partially privatize 
pensions despite the rising tide of evidence concerning the challenges associated with the policy. 
We argue that while part of the domestic political elite remained supportive of private funded 
pensions, the difficulties experienced by earlier reformers and reduced support from International 
Financial Institutions led to the adoption of small funded pension pillars. Such cautious attempts 
at privatization might become more common in the future as large reforms have proven politically 
unsustainable. 
Due to copyright reasons, the full text of this article is not part of the electronic version of the 
dissertation. Please use the following link to get access to the full text: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/issr.12066/abstract 
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Paper 3: From Austerity to Austerity: The Political Economy of 
Public Pension Reforms in Romania and Bulgaria 
 
Adascalitei, D. 2015. From Austerity to Austerity: The Political Economy of Public Pension 
Reforms in Romania and Bulgaria, Social Policy & Administration Article First Published Online. 
DOI: 10.1111/spol.12173 
 
Abstract 
This article discusses the trajectories of pension system reforms in two of the latecomers to the 
EU: Bulgaria and Romania. It finds that over the past two decades, the two countries pursued 
increasingly dissimilar public pension reforms for managing their respective public pay-as-you-
go pension systems. Using a political institutionalist theoretical framework, I argue that the 
divergence between the two cases is attributable to multiple factors. First, different temporary 
political compromises between national and international actors generated reforms that retrenched 
public pensions and introduced mandatory private accounts. Second, pension reforms often had 
unintended consequences that limited their intended impact. Third, incremental adjustments 
introduced by governments in response to political pressures caused alternating phases of austerity 
and generosity that catered to different constituencies in each country. In Romania, reform 
outcomes amounted to a moderately generous pension system, financed through relatively high 
contribution rates with a small funded component, while in the case of Bulgaria, the pension 
system evolved into a meagre programme, financed through low contribution rates and a larger 
private pillar. 
Due to copyright reasons, the full text of this article is not part of the electronic version of the 
dissertation. Please use the following link to get access to the full text: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/spol.12173/abstract 
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This paper analyzes the outcomes of pension reforms in two Eastern European countries, Belarus 
and Ukraine. It seeks to explain why, unlike other countries in the region, the two comparators 
have not opted for the introduction of mandatary private accounts. In addition, it seeks to provide 
an analysis of the alternative reforms that each of the two countries used for managing their public 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. It shows that whereas in the case of Belarus, the 
rejection of the pension privatization agenda was an explicit choice by the political elite, in the 
case of Ukraine, the second pillar received political support in government but failed to generate 
a legislative coalition around it and ultimately was not implemented.  Furthermore, reforms to 
adjust public PAYG pension benefits diverged between the two countries: whereas in Belarus 
they targeted the preservation of benefit generosity, in Ukraine they alternated between phases of 
austerity and generosity.  
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Introduction 
In the last two decades a great deal of intellectual effort has been placed in explaining the 
institutional changes that Eastern European (EE) pension systems have undergone. With few 
exceptions (Cashu 2000; Müller 2002), most of the studies focused on the reforms that introduced 
individual pension savings accounts - a phenomenon commonly referred to as ‘pension 
privatization’. Nevertheless, the repertoire of reforms that marked the pension policy making 
during the past two decades was not limited to privatizing measures. More frequently, public pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems were changed in a gradual manner through alterations of their 
parameters. These changes included benefit levels adjustments, shifts in the contribution rates, as 
well as more complex changes in indexation formulas, eligibility criteria, and retirement ages. To 
differing degrees, these measures have been implemented across most of the EE countries (Cerami 
and Vanhuysse 2009; Guardiancich 2012). They represented an effort of governments in transition 
economies to bring the public PAYG pension systems in line with the new social and economic 
conditions.  
Compared with their Western counterparts, which introduced parametric pension reforms in a 
sequential manner that built upon long phasing-in periods (Bonoli and Palier 2007), EE 
governments could not afford similar time horizons for passing pension reforms due to the rising 
fiscal pressures caused by the economic and social crises experienced by  the majority of countries 
in the region. Crisis driven adjustments resulted in a type of emergency policy-making (Inglot 
2008) that was biased towards temporary solutions to social insurance problems. Above all, 
emergency policy-making allowed post–communist governments to gain significant control over 
social policy reforms in comparison with other national political actors. At the same time, it made 
pension reforms more sensitive to domestic political shifts that oftentimes led to contradictory 
interventions by successive governments. Consequently, outcomes of adjustments in PAYG 
public pension systems have varied substantially across countries.  
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This paper seeks to explain why some EE countries did not opt for introducing mandatory private 
accounts, and instead adjusted their public PAYG pension systems through marginal parametric 
adjustments. Second, it seeks to analyze the variation in pension system adjustment strategies 
between countries that did not introduce second pillars. To do so, the paper discusses the 
determinants of public pension reforms in two less studied East European countries: Belarus and 
Ukraine. The two countries began the transition to capitalism with similar state administered 
public PAYG pension systems. During the socialist period, universal retirement schemes with low 
retirement ages and financing based almost exclusively on employers’ contributions were 
introduced in each country. Pension systems were integrated into state budgets thus being subject 
to similar expenditure policies.  
Following the demise of the socialist regimes in the region, the two countries preserved many of 
the features of their pension systems such as low retirement ages and relatively high contribution 
rates. At the same time, unlike many of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) they 
did not introduce mandatory private accounts. Still, important differences between the pension 
system reform outcomes emerged during and after the economic transition. Ukraine alternated 
between a radical pension benefit retrenchment phase from 1991 to 2003, a radical expansionary 
phase between 2003 and 2009, and another retrenchment phase after 2009. Furthermore, attempts 
to introduce mandatory private accounts failed. In comparison, Belarus avoided retrenchment 
altogether, while preserving the institutional structure of its public pension system almost intact.  
Benefit generosity suffered a steep decline during the recent economic crisis, but it soon recovered 
as a result of government efforts to restore pensioners’ welfare.  
The paper explains the above outcomes by tracing the determinants of parametric adjustments in 
public PAYG pension systems in the two countries. Parametric changes in the public pension 
systems have often been overlooked because they are frequently viewed as ‘too small’ to be taken 
into consideration. Yet, although they do not change the institutional structure of public pension 
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systems, their fiscal and distributional impact is significant. As public pension systems remain the 
most important social policy items in these countries both in terms of coverage and expenditure 
levels, changes in their parameters have immediate welfare consequences. 
I claim that two elements are critical for explaining the pension reform outcomes between the two 
countries. First, I show that the political regime type impacted how national political elites 
responded to international pressures for reform: while in the Ukraine the opening of the regime in 
2003 led to an attempt to sync the national pension reform strategy to the international agenda 
advocated by the World Bank (WB), in the case of the of the authoritarian regime of Belarus, 
pension reform was insulated from any outside influence. Furthermore, I show that in the case of 
Ukraine, the fractionalization of the party system led to the failure to implement the second pillar 
reform as well as to tying parametric adjustments in benefit levels to the electoral cycle – a 
practice that resulted in high fiscal deficits of the social security budget.  In comparison, in 
Belarus, the political regime drew its political support from pensioners, and therefore sought to 
protect the generosity of the public pension system at any cost.  While this strategy has functioned 
well during times of economic growth, the recent economic and currency crises that affected the 
country after 2009 have revealed its limits:  the generosity of pension benefits was preserved, a 
practice that generated significant fiscal pressures on the budget of the country.  
 
Drivers of pension reform 
In this section I outline the economic and political factors that shaped these adjustments. Building 
on previous literature (Kitschelt 2001; Armeanu 2010) I distinguish between factors that create 
the demand for reform and factors that impact the supply side of reform. On the demand side, I 
discuss the economic and demographic crises that impacted public pensions over the last two 
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decades. On the supply side, I analyze the regime type, the levels of party fractionalization, and 
the influence of International Financial Institutions (IFIs).  
Economic crises have impacted pension systems through several channels. First, the rise in 
unemployment levels during economic downturns significantly weakened revenues gathered from 
social security contributions.  Furthermore, given that in the early 1990s EE unemployment 
systems were underdeveloped, many countries liberalized access to pensions by allowing workers 
to take early retirement. This policy led to considerable increases in the pensioner demographic 
during very short periods of time especially in CEECs (Vanhuysse 2006). By comparison, in the 
Community for Independent States (CIS) countries early exit into pensions was less widespread 
since these countries adjusted to the new economic conditions by keeping workers employed but 
underpaid and with large wage arrears (Gimpelson 2001).  
Second, crises have been associated with an increase in employment in the informal sector and 
large scale tax evasion (Stephan Haggard and Kaufman 2008). State owned enterprises typically 
defaulted on social security contributions which added to the worsening of the financial situation 
of the pension systems (Kyle et al. 2001). Third, when accompanied by inflationary periods, crises 
had a direct impact on benefit levels. Concerns over monetary policies during periods of high 
inflation, led governments in the region to drop the automatic indexation of old age benefits and 
replace it with ad-hoc increases that decreased substantially the generosity of public pensions.  
Adverse demographics also impacted public pension systems. Over the last two decades, the 
elderly dependency ratio increased due to declining fertility rates and high mortality rates 
especially among working age men. The latter was particularly high in the CIS countries where 
economic policies such as the mass privatization programs contributed to higher mortality rates 
amongst workers (Stuckler, King, and McKee 2009).  For example, the gender differences in life 
expectancy at birth are 12 years in Belarus and 11 years in Ukraine (Botev 2012). This negative 
situation is further deteriorated by the population shrinking due to migration. Overall, both trends 
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contributed to a general decline in the ratio of contribution to beneficiaries and an increasing need 
to divert public resources for financing pension expenditures.  
On the supply side, the political regime type influenced both what policies were considered to be 
as viable reform alternatives as well as the responsiveness of the local elites to international 
pressures to reform. In this respect, early scholarship emphasized that authoritarian regimes are 
more capable in pursuing radical pension reforms because of the capacity of their executives to 
by-pass societal interests(Orenstein 1999; Cook 2007). Indeed, privatizing reforms have been 
passed with mixed results in different authoritarian regimes such as Chile or Kazakhstan. 
However, other countries such as Belarus, did not privatize and resorted only to parametric 
reforms for adjusting their pension systems. Moreover, pension reform outcomes in authoritarian 
regimes are as diverse as in democratic ones. This stems from the fact that there is no archetypal 
authoritarian regime but a variety of regimes that build their political support in different ways. 
(Forrat 2012).  
While authoritarian regimes may not be democratically accountable to political constituencies, 
they remain dependent on popular expectations about social security. Since repression alone 
cannot ensure regime stability, authoritarian regimes must rely on policies that build loyalty 
among workers (Wintrobe 2000). This suggests that pension reforms can be driven by the need 
of the regime to ensure its own political survival. As the empirical part of the paper will show, 
this is indeed the case of Belarus – an instance where the pension system preserved its highly 
redistributive character because of its role in maintaining the legitimacy of the political system.  
A defining characteristic that sets apart pension policy making in authoritarian regimes and 
democratic regimes is that of the impact of societal interests on reforms is practically non-existent. 
Unlike democratic regimes, where pension reforms are the result of societal pressures coming 
from opposition parties, trade unions or employers’ organizations, in authoritarian systems 
pension reforms are driven exclusively by elite policy-making. Thus they do not reflect societal 
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demands for protection but elite ideas about welfare policies and their role in the survival of the 
regime. The decoupling of pension policies from the influence of societal interests means that 
they are imposed from above  thus giving elites greater space in pursuing their political and 
economic goals (Stephan Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 7). Therefore, in authoritarian regimes, 
pension system reforms depend on how elites perceive the role of social policy: either as a 
benevolent paternalist policy, as a means to promote state building, as a source of economic 
development or as a means of political control (Forrat 2012). 
By comparison, in competitive authoritarian regimes elections do take place and provide 
incentives to incumbent governments to compete through welfare promises (Levitsky and Way 
2010). Governments prioritize short term electoral goals and make use of pension system 
adjustments in order to gain popularity amongst their constituents while limiting the opposition’s 
capacity to compete. Thus, in competitive authoritarian regimes, pension system adjustments are 
less likely to address the long term fiscal pressures generated by adverse demographics or 
economic crises, and, instead, focus on reforms that have immediate distributive consequences 
for retirees or those about to retire. Increases in the generosity of benefits are amongst the most 
widely used policy reforms since they are immediately visible to constituencies and do not require 
significant institutional resources to be adopted. More so, when competitive authoritarian regimes 
are characterized by high levels of intra-elite conflict and unstable party systems, reforms that 
require sustained commitment and consensus building are less probable to find political support. 
In the absence of elite consensus, privatizing reforms are therefore unlikely to be adopted, even 
when International Financial Institutions (IFIs) exercise pressures in their favor. 
Therefore how parties compete and how they envisage their prospects of survival between 
electoral cycles, conditions the reforms they support when in power. A widely used indicator for 
describing the relevant number of parties in a polity is the degree of fractionalization of the party 
system  measured by the effective number of parties index (ENPP) Laakso and Tagepera (1979). 
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The index is a function of the vote share of each party relative to the total number of votes. In 
comparison with other measures, such as the degree of polarization, which is based on the seat 
share of the largest opposition party relative to the executive (Frye 2010, 53 –54), the ENPP fits 
better contexts where smaller parties  exercise a significant control over policy making. At the 
same time, the ENPP offers an insight on the number of partisan veto players (M.A. Orenstein 
2000)that have the power to fight reforms. Values under 3 indicate low levels of fractionalization, 
values between 3 and 6 indicate moderate levels of fractionalization while values above 6 point 
to high levels of fractionalization. Table 1 shows the development of party fractionalization in 
Ukraine between 1994 and 20141. As the table shows, in Ukraine party fractionalization has 
shifted from very high levels during the 1990s2, to moderate levels in the 2000s, and then returned 
to high levels after the 2014 parliamentary election.   
{Table 1 about here} 
Fractionalization of the party system impacts the capacity of governments to pursue reforms (S. 
Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Increased levels of fractionalization imply high levels of political 
uncertainty leading to difficulties in creating support for costly welfare reforms. This has several 
implications for the reforms of public pension systems. First, changing the indexation mechanism 
will be the preferred policy option for handling pension outlays because of its immediate impact 
and minimal amount of political resources involved in passing such a reform. As opposed to 
bigger changes, such as increases in the retirement ages, shifts in the indexation mechanisms are 
relatively easy to adopt and do not require lengthy additional regulations (Schludi 2006). Second, 
reforms that include long term political commitments, such as the introduction of private pillars, 
are unlikely to be sustained since political parties are unlikely to survive for more than one 
electoral cycle. Third, special retirement regimes that offer selective benefits to different 
                                                          
1 Belarus is not included because the index is meaningless in an authoritarian context.  
2 The high level of fractionalization in Ukraine in 1994 is caused by the large share of legislative seats obtain by 
independent candidates (51.42% of the total).  
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categories of workers are likely to be protected and used as a method of building support among 
these groups.  
Pension reform agenda was also influenced by international actors, and in particular by the WB, 
which promoted a dual agenda of retrenchment and privatization. In its 1994 flagship report, 
Averting the Old-Age Crisis the WB endorsed a shift towards three pillar systems of pension 
provision, since it believed that public PAYG pension systems generated labor market 
imbalances, decreased economic growth, and failed to adequately protect benefits against 
demographic and economic crises (World Bank 1994). The structural shift towards a three pillar 
systems implied a substantial retrenchment of public pensions to paying modest flat-rate benefits 
(Beattie and McGillivray 1995). Since the complete shift towards private pension provision had 
to take place over a long period of time, and with substantial budgetary costs for public pension 
budgets, the institution promoted a retrenchment agenda based on longer contribution periods, 
higher retirement ages, shifting the burden of contribution towards employees and a decrease in 
employers’ contributions, and stricter rules for special retirement regimes.   
It is noteworthy that the WB type of pension reform involving retrenchment and privatization has 
been adopted thought EE with varying degrees of success depending on domestic factors such as 
the level of external debt of a country (Müller 2003), the effectiveness of transnational campaigns 
that advocated for privatization(Mitchell A Orenstein 2008) or the coming to power of coalitions 
that supported the privatization agenda (Armeanu 2010). While the majority of the EE countries 
did follow the WB model of pension reform, some have rejected it altoghether.  Moreover, it is 
worth noting that the recent economic crisis has put a dent into the spread of the policy across the 
region. Some of the early privatizers in the CIS region such as Russia or Kazakhstan have partially 
or entirely reversed the reform out of fiscal concerns regarding the benefits of keeping a privately 
managed second pillar. Similarly, in CEECs, a wave of partial reversals and nationalizations has 
affected private pillars (Drahokoupil and Domonkos 2012).   
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The next sections bring empirical evidence on how each of the factors discussed above contributed 
to the trajectories of public pension reforms in Ukraine and Belarus. I show that while pension 
privatization was not implemented in the two countries, parametric reforms have had long lasting 
fiscal and distributional consequences. I provide a historical overview of the main episodes of 
reform and bring case-study empirical evidence to support my arguments. The last section 
concludes with a discussion on the different pathways of reform that characterized pension policy 
making in the two EE countries.  
 
Politics of pension reform in Ukraine 
In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine suffered from the most severe 
economic crisis in EE with its cumulative economic output dropping by 60 per cent between 1990 
and 1999 (Sologoub 2010). The crisis reflected heavily on pensions which lost almost entirely in 
their purchasing power. By 1998 they were at 15.3 per cent of their 1990 value (see Table 2). A 
key problem of the public pension system was the existence of large arrears owed to the budget 
by public enterprises and the payment delays that often took months to reach pensioners (Malysh 
2000). The country also experienced a massive demographic crisis since independence due to high 
male mortality rates, reduced birth rates, and extensive emigration. Due to these factors the public 
pension system began to display deficits as of 1993. Initially the government opted for subsidizing 
the deficit but soon was unable to maintain the level of budget transfers and thus it shifted its 
policy to shrinking benefits by letting them fall against inflation. Concomitantly, the contribution 
rates were increased and the maximum pension was limited.  
{Table 2 about here} 
During this period, pension reform programs never entered into serious public debate. Party 
fractionalization was so high that hardly any reforms could be agreed upon. As the Ukrainian 
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transition coincided with a period of state and nation building, most political conflicts revolved 
around the separation of powers between the President and Parliament and the relationship 
between Ukrainian and Russian identity (Taras Kuzio 2002). These conflicts led to periods of 
intense confrontations between the President, who sought to increase his formal powers and the 
Parliament which sought more control over the executive and especially over the appointment of 
ministers. Meanwhile, governments operating under short time horizons and facing constraints 
from both the Parliament and the President became incapable of pursuing any policies. Due to 
these factors legislative bills were most of the time defeated before being passed into law.  
The party system remained very weak and highly fractionalized thought the entire transition 
period. As D’Anieri (2007, 59) notes, ‘weak parties became a self-reinforcing prophecy in 
Ukraine’. In fact, the party system resembled an informal network of interests comprising both 
old and new elites  rather than an institutionalized structure (Fritz 2007). As a result, shifting 
allegiances between parliamentary blocks had small political costs. Given these short time 
horizons, none of the political factions in Parliament favored extensive pension or welfare 
reforms.  
The first serious reform program was adopted only in 1998 and was facilitated by the decrease in 
the levels of party fractionalization which contributed to the emergence of a more structured pro-
presidential center-right political block under the leadership of Victor Yushchenko. Upon his 
confirmation as Prime Minister, Yushchenko started a reform program based on price 
liberalization, administrative reform and anticorruption measures (Åslund 2009). The reforms had 
a positive impact on the state budget, allowing for a timely payment of pensions and wages in the 
public sector.  
Two years later, in 2000, the Yushchenko government submitted the first draft laws on social 
insurance reforms to Parliament. The draft proposed the introduction of a WB three pillar pension 
system and a series of reforms aimed at streamlining public PAYG pension expenditures. The 
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proposed reforms included the indexation of pension benefits to inflation plus 20 per cent of the 
increase in real wages; the gradual increase in the retirement age for men and women, a longer 
contribution rate for obtaining a full pension, and an accrual rate for each year of delayed pension. 
However, by April 2001 the backing of the government in Parliament began to disintegrate. Some 
of the parties that previously supported the Yuschenko government feared that the continuation 
of market reforms will hurt their business interests and retracted their political support. As a result, 
the government faced a vote of no confidence and was ousted from power. Pension reform was 
yet again postponed for an indefinite period of time.  
The 2002 parliamentary elections, brought to power a pro-presidential coalition that supported 
Victor Yanukovych as Prime Minister (Fritz 2007, 180). The Yanukovych government was 
formed primarily from oligarchs from Eastern Ukraine who had right or center-right ideological 
views (Åslund 2009). Its program, which included the restarting pension reforms, was approved 
by the Parliament with a large majority of votes. As a result, two years after coming to power, the 
government succeeded to pass several of the reforms that were included in the Yushchenko 
program. The changes introduced by the 2003-2004 reforms were however very limited and 
avoided to introduce too many unpopular retrenchment measures.   
Importantly, the new law sought reduce early retirement by increasing benefits to those who chose 
to retire later, increased the work period of calculating pension benefits and created a social 
assistance system for those not eligible for pension benefits. Nevertheless, out of fears of popular 
backlash ahead of the 2004 presidential elections, the planned increase in the retirement age was 
not adopted. At the same time, social security contributions remained high despite demands from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce payroll taxation (IMF 2003a; IMF 2005). 
Further, the legal framework for the introduction of the mandatory private accounts was adopted 
but and was conditioned on the lack of deficit in the public PAYG system. Instead, the reform 
allowed the creation of non-state pension funds financed through voluntary contributions.     
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However, the possible budgetary savings generated by the reforms were cancelled by the sudden 
doubling of the minimum pensions in the eve of 2004 presidential elections (Betliy and Handrich 
2006). This measure alone added a 3 per cent deficit to the public PAYG system thus effectively 
eliminating the possibility of implementing the second pillar reform. As a result, while the 
legislation regulating private pension remained in place, the private pillar was not de facto 
introduced – a situation that was similar with that of Romania at the time. Moreover, the political 
change that was brought by the Orange Revolution put the pension reform to a standstill.  
In political terms, the outcome of the Orange Revolution seemed to produce a significant decrease 
in the level of fractionalization of the party system. However, as D’ Anieri notes, despite the fact 
that fewer parties entered in Parliament in 2002 and 2005, they quickly split, hence preserving the 
high levels of political fragmentation (D’Anieri 2007, 149). Existing literature emphasizes the 
deep political conflicts that marked the reorganization of political life in Ukraine after 2004 
(Flikke 2008; Kubicek 2009; Aslund 2005). The continued strife over resources and political 
power undermined any possibility of carrying out reforms. Instead the pension system was used 
for electoral purposes. Competition through pension promises became essential as elections 
increased in importance in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution as the political regime opened 
up. In this context, the programs of all the parties that competed in the parliamentary elections of 
2004, 2006 and 2007 contained promises for pension increases. From this point of view, the turn 
towards democratic politics in Ukraine connected the demands for redistribution with the 
patronage and rent-seeking behavior of the Ukrainian elites.  
Indeed, while intra-elite competition for state assets continued after 2004, the opening-up of the 
political system increased the pressures from below. This yielded a move in the political system 
towards ‘social populism ’(T. Kuzio 2012) reinforced by inflated welfare promises during 
elections. Therefore, the change of the political regime led to the recovery of the adequacy of 
pension benefits but it also contributed to growing expenditures in a very short period of time (see 
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Fig. 1). The growing pension outlays needed to be supported through high payroll taxes and 
receipts from privatization of state owned companies. Thus by 2010, pension expenditure alone 
amounted to 17.7 per cent of GDP, making Ukraine the country with the highest level of pension 
expenditures in the world.  
{Figure 1 about here} 
Increasing pension expenditures impacted benefit generosity, which in 2009 reached its highest 
levels since the beginning of transition.  However, the economic crisis had a deep impact on the 
Ukrainian economy leading to a 14.2 percent decline in GDP levels (IMF 2011). In consequence, 
pensions were the first items targeted by the austerity measures passed in response to the economic 
crisis. The first measure undertaken by the government was to freeze the indexation of pension 
benefits which resulted in the drop of net replacement ratios. Between 2009 and 2012 the net 
replacement ratio dropped by 8 percentage points which brought pension generosity to the 2005 
levels.  
The crisis also forced the government to seek financial assistance from the IMF. Besides short-
term austerity measures, the IMF required the government to pursue a more substantial pension 
reform (IMF 2011). However, compared to advice given to countries a decade earlier, the 
institution did not demand the introduction of a private pillar, but focused on pushing for 
retrenchment measures that targeted the public pension system. In fact, the institution, argued that 
given the high deficit of the public pension system, which in 2009 reached 5.2% of GDP, 
introducing a private pillar would only worsen the financial problems of the public system.3 
Thus, the IMF conditioned the continuation of its financial assistance on the implementation of a 
parametric pension reform. While the IMF pressure brought the pension reform back on the 
                                                          
3 The information was given to the author during an interview with the IMF representative in Ukraine in 
September 2012.  
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legislative agenda, political conflicts within the Parliament led to considerable delays in passing 
it. In particular, the pro-presidential Party of Regions, the largest party in Parliament, tried to 
avoid supporting the increase in the retirement age for women out of fears of a popular backlash 
during the upcoming parliamentary elections. While the internal debate over austerity measures 
seemed to stall the legislation in Parliament, the IMF suddenly announced that it stopped the 
disbursement of the 4th tranche of its loan agreement with Ukraine.    
The IMF threat had the intended effect: the legislative unblocked the pension reform legislation 
and passed the new law in 2011. 
The reform raised the retirement age for women to 604, increased the minimum insurance period 
for obtaining full pension benefits with five years for both men and women, and capped the high 
pensions. Despite the fact that the reform restored the financial assistance from the IMF, it did not 
have a significant fiscal impact. The law instituted a 3 year grace period in which women can 
choose to retire early under the new rules. At the same time, the restrictions on the special pensions 
apply only to new pensioners, thus leaving the existing inequalities unchanged. Moreover, another 
wave of government mandated increases in benefit levels was passed ahead of the 2012 
parliamentary elections (Åslund 2015). 
Summing up, in Ukraine pension reforms have been limited by high levels of party 
fractionalization. Over the past two decades, governments have passed only partial institutional 
reforms that preserved the structure of the inherited pension system, and tied increases in 
generosity to the electoral cycle. Although the introduction of the second pillar was considered 
after the opening of the regime in the early 2000s, the reform was undermined by the unsustainable 
increases in benefit generosity that were adopted by various governments after 2004. Even when 
external pressure from IFIs pushed the government to adopt a serious parametric reform during 
                                                          
4 The retirement age for women is scheduled to increase by half a year, each year, over the next decade. 
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the recent crisis, the adjustments introduced did not address the main problems of the public 
PAYG pension system.  
 
Politics of pension reform in Belarus 
Unlike Ukraine, Belarus made a return to electoral authoritarianism through the presidential 
elections of 1994. This came after a period of relative liberalization that, as in other countries in 
EE, resulted in an economic crisis. Besides, as Ioffe (2004) notes spillovers form the Russian 
transitional crisis impacted the Belarusian economy up to the point that by 1994 most of the 
industrial enterprises in the country were near to discontinuing operations (Ioffe 2004). Amidst 
this context of economic instability, presidential elections brought in power Aleksandr 
Lukashenko – a former Kolkhoz director who steered the country into an authoritarian direction.  
Soon after taking office Lukashenko began establishing a political regime based on extensive state 
control over the economy and constraints on the capacity of working class to organize. Politically, 
the institution of the President was strengthened while the powers of the Parliament were severely 
restrained. At the same time, previous liberalizing reforms were overturned by restoring a high 
degree of state ownership, introducing controls over profits and margins, adopting a system of 
state redistribution over “priority sectors” and centrally setting wage targets (Korosteleva 2011). 
Additionally, the national budget was patched by using loans from Russia obtained at special 
interest rates and a preferential agreement over the oil price. This made the country immune to 
the perils of transition that marked the other two economies but also isolated it from external 
influences (Nuti 2000). Unemployment remained low and pension expenditure fairly steady. The 
pension level was set at 25 percent of the living wage with a strong redistributive component 
towards low income workers. 
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Subsequently the regime assumed a paternalist pension policy in exchange for political support 
from pensioner groups. Indeed, Haiduk et al. (2009) find that support for the political regime in 
Belarus is high among pensioners who prioritize political stability and the delivery of a minimum 
social package over economic  and social reforms. In consequence, pension benefits were 
prioritized by the regime and were protected against inflation while the minimum pension was 
increased several times starting from 1995 (Chubrik et al. 2009). Besides, the pension system 
contains a highly redistributive element with very small differences between the minimum and 
the maximum pensions. Thus, Belarus has the lowest level of inequality among the successor 
states of the Soviet Union and the highest levels of redistribution through social programs and 
wage increases (Fritz 2007).  
Despite the relatively generous pension system in terms of retirement age and replacement rate 
(see Figure 2), the Social Security Fund (SSF) never displayed deficits. This is mainly because 
the SSF received generous subsidies from the state budget which retained as a main source of 
revenue, income from state owned enterprises. For example, in 2002 when the SSF reserves were 
exhausted, the government stepped in and insured that the pension payments will not be delayed 
(IMF 2003b). In addition, as in the case of  Ukraine, the generous pension system was financed 
through increases in social security contributions from 25.2 per cent in 1992 to 35 per cent in 2010 
(UN 2009).  
{Figure 2 about here} 
The lack of deficits in the SSF and a stable growth rate during transition minimized the incentives 
to reform the pension system. Under these conditions, the government has been resilient in 
accepting any changes in the public pension system especially changes regarding the increase in 
the retirement ages or any form of retrenchment. Furthermore, the influence of external actors has 
been minimal due to the lack high debt levels. As a result, the WB campaign for shifting to a 
defined contribution system and the gradual introduction of private accounts had little impact. 
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The Ministry of Labor acknowledged the need for the introduction of the WB model in mid’ 2000s 
but none of the reforms made it into legislation.  
The absence of reforms is also due to the institutional arrangements which prevailed in Belarus 
after 1994. The constitutional reform that took place in 1996 limited the political impact of the 
Parliament and reduced parties’ capacity to organize. At the same time, civil society groups such 
as trade unions have faced tough sanctions each time they voiced opposition and had limited 
opportunities to access the policy process. Thus alternative reform proposals were less likely to 
be formulated given the minimal impact of Parliament and civil society. 
However, the economic and currency crises that affected the country after 2008, have aggravated 
the situation of the pension system.  The level of external debt of the country has risen sharply 
from 25 percent of GDP at the end of 2008 to 61 percent of GDP at the end of 2011 (IMF 2012). 
At the same time, the real value of pension benefits dropped substantially in 2011, when they 
amounted to 77 per cent of their 2010 value (see Figure 3). Pensioners lost much faster in their 
purchasing power in comparison with workers as the government opted for letting benefits fall 
against inflation. However, the impact of the crisis has been curtailed through mandating an 
increase in pension benefit levels a year later. Further, while the statutory increase in the 
retirement age was not considered, the government introduced incentives for those who continue 
to work beyond retirement age. Thus the regime has been adverse on embarking even in limited 
reforms out of fears that such a path will endanger its stability.  
{Figure 3 around here} 
Therefore, compared with Ukraine, Belarus has experienced a shorter and the more stable 
transition that preserved both the social and political institutions of the state socialist system. 
Unlike other countries in the region, the political regime in Belarus, rejected privatization both as 
a way to reform the inherited state economic sector as well as an approach to social security 
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management. Instead, the political regime kept the public PAYG pension system relatively stable 
and used it for creating loyalty among workers and pensioners. This was achieved through the 
introduction of a highly redistributive formula for calculating pension benefits and a policy of 
indexation that safeguarded the adequacy of pensions against economic fluctuations.  
 
Conclusion 
 The analysis of the country cases undertaken above demonstrates that the political dynamics 
associated with which political regime type have contributed to the choice of specific pension 
reform alternatives.  In the case of Ukraine, the opening up of the political regime in the beginning 
of 2000s has contributed to a shift in the pension reform agenda towards the WB pillar model. By 
comparison, in the case of Belarus, the privatization agenda was rejected altogether, the regime 
opted instead to preserve the institutional structure of the pension system inherited from the 
socialist period.   
Furthermore, the paper showed that fractionalization of the legislative impacted the capacity of 
governments to pass pension reforms and encouraged competition through pension promises – a 
tendency that contributed to significant increases of pension outlays in Ukraine. High levels of 
legislative fractionalization were associated with relying excessively on changes in the benefit 
indexation mechanism for managing expenditures and the absence of other reforms.  The paper 
also showed that the fractionalization of the party system has ultimately contributed to the failure 
of the Ukrainian second pillar reform. While the legislative framework of the private system has 
been adopted more than a decade ago, the system was not implemented due to the accumulation 
of large fiscal deficits in the state PAYG system as a result of numerous increases in benefit levels 
mandated by governments after 2004.  
The Ukrainian episodes of pension reform also show that retrenchment was possible only after 
the IMF exercised direct pressure on the government through withholding its financial assistance 
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in a time of crisis. However, the reform passed in response to the IMF pressure has had a doubtful 
fiscal impact: whereas formally the increase in the retirement ages for women has been legislated 
and the streamlining of high pension benefits for new entrants has been adopted,  in practice these 
measures do little to address the existing inequalities in the Ukrainian pension system. At the same 
time, the government continue to mandate increases in benefit generosity ahead of elections, thus 
keeping the pension system dependent on the political cycle. 
In comparison, in Belarus the recent crisis has provided a test for the commitment of the regime 
towards its model of social economy (Yarashevich 2014). The paper has shown that despite the 
fact that the economic and monetary crises that affected the country after 2008 have led to a 
substantial loss in the generosity of pension benefits, these have recovered as the regime sought 
to restore the welfare of is most loyal constituents. However, the crisis seems to have destabilized 
the Belarussian pension system as expenditures as well as dependency ratios are steadily projected 
to grow in the upcoming years (World Bank 2012). 
The paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the pathways of welfare reforms in EE by 
discussing the trajectory of pension adjustments in two less studied countries. It has shown that 
in spite of similar legacies and initially similar political regime types, the two countries have opted 
for different solutions for adjusting their pension systems. It has also shown that the 
unconsolidated democratic regime in Ukraine has had a radical impact on the country’s pension 
system – moving it towards a fiscal disaster in the short and medium term.   
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Tables and Figures. 
 
 
Table 1 Effective Number of Political Parties (ENPP) index in Ukraine, 1994 -2014 
   1994 1998 2002 2006 2007 2012 2014 
ENPP   14.84 10.04 4.67 3.38 3.30 5.07 6.64 
Source: (2002 -2007): (Gallagher 2013); Own calculations based on the data 
from the Electoral Commission of Ukraine (http://www.cvk.gov.ua/) 
 
 
Table 2 Indicators of the pension system in Ukraine 1991 - 1999 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Real GDP, % (1990=100) 91.3 82.3 70.6 54.3 47.7 42.9 41.6 41 40.7 
Inflation, % 290 2,000 10,155 401 182 39.7 10.1 20 19.2 
Number of retirees, million 13.6 14.2 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.4 14.4 
Retirees, % of the population 26.2 27.3 27.8 27.8 28 28.4 28.7 28.7 28.9 
Pension expenditure, % to GDP 9.5 7.9 8.3 7.4 7.9 9.3 10.3 9.5 10 
Real pension, % (1990=100) 79.6 68.5 23.1 15.9 18.4 17.2 15.7 15.3 26.3 
Source OECD (2001) 
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 Source: Own calculations based on data from Ukrainian National Statistical Institute 
(http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/) 
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Figure 1. Pension Expenditure (left axis) and Net 
Pension Replacement Rates (right axis) in Ukraine:  
1996 - 2012.
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 Source: European Commission (2009) and Yarashevich (2014). 
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Figure 2. Pension Expenditure (left axis) and Net 
Pension Replacement Rates (right axis) in Belarus:  
1996 - 2012.
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Source:  Republic of Belarus, Statistical Yearbook 2015. 
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